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This paper addresses one of the oldest and most controversial issues in 
economics: Why do some countries succeed in catching up, while others fall 
behind?  In recent years the quality and availability of data on different aspects 
of development have improved a lot. Attempting to exploit this opportunity for 
more in-depth research the paper starts with an overview and assessment of the 
different approaches in the literature and the empirical indicators and methods 
that these have given rise to. This leads to the formulation of a synthetic 
empirical model and, with the help of factor analysis on large variable set, to the 
identification of set of “capabilities” which might be assumed to be of critical 
importance for catch up. The explanatory power of these capabilities for 
economic growth is tested on a sample of 135 countries in the 1990s. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Is there an inbuilt tendency for productivity and income across the globe to 
converge? If we look at capitalist development in a long run perspective the answer is 
clear. The long run trend since the so-called industrial revolution has been towards 
divergence, not convergence in productivity and income. For instance, according to 
economic historian David Landes, 250 years ago the difference in income or 
productivity per head between the richest and poorest country in the world was 
approximately 5:1, while today this difference has increased to 400:1 (Landes 1998). 
Other sources may give different numbers but the qualitative interpretation remains 
the same. In section 2 of this paper we provide some evidence on these trends for a 
large sample of countries which confirms that the diverging winds continue to be 
strong.    
 
However, in spite of this long run trend towards divergence in productivity 
and income, there are many examples of (initially) backward countries that – at 
different times – have managed to narrow the gap in productivity and income between 
themselves and the frontier countries, in other words, to “catch up”. The current 
frontier country  – the United States – was itself once on a catch-up path vis-à-vis the 
then economically and technologically leading country of the time, the United 
Kingdom, and so were Germany and many other European countries. Japan in the 
decades before and after the Second World War is another well-known example, and 
the so-called “Asian tigers” more recently. The question that suggests itself is how 
this diversity in patterns of development can be explained. Why do some countries 
succeed in catching up, while others fall behind? Is it related to something they do   3
that other countries fail to undertake? In fact, this is one of the oldest and most 
controversial issues in economics. It can be traced back at least a few hundred years, 
when politicians and industrialists in countries such as the United States and Germany 
started to debate what was needed to be able to catch up with the then world leader, 
the United Kingdom (see Chang 2002). 
 
In section 3 we start the search for what these critical factors for catch-up may 
be. We do this by reviewing some of the main arguments (or “views”) that have been 
presented in the literature and discussing what empirical measures these give (or may 
give) rise to. Traditionally, much theorizing in this area focused on the role of capital 
accumulation for growth and development.  Gradually this has given way to a more 
“institutionalist” view, focusing on how to get the institutional conditions for well-
working markets (including the capital market) right. Therefore, this is sometimes 
called the “market friendly” approach (World Bank 1993). Its main contender has for 
some time been a more “knowledge based” approach, according to which catching up 
(or lack of such) depends not so much on capital accumulation as the abilities of a 
country to create and exploit knowledge (and respond to challenges arising in 
connection with this). This naturally leads to a focus on what influences the capacity 
of a country for creating and exploiting knowledge including relevant policy aspects. 
Concepts such as “social capability” and “absorptive capacity” have been important 
focusing devices within this approach. Finally we consider the most novel addition in   4
this area, the “social capital” approach, which focuses on the role that social norms, 
networking and civic engagement may play in the development process.
1 
 
Having considered the various arguments and the empirical measures they 
give rise to we start in section 4 on the synthesis work. Rather than picking individual 
indicators we follow Adleman and Morris (1965, 1967) and Temple and Johnson 
(1998) in mapping the most central elements with the help of factor analysis, taking 
into account a variety of different indicators and sources in 135 countries over 1992-
2002. Factor analysis is a useful tool in the present context because it allows us to 
reduce the complexity entailed by a large number of different (but often mutually 
correlated) indicators into a smaller number of synthetic dimensions. The analysis 
illustrates the multidimensional character of “social capability”, resulting in five 
different dimensions (or capabilities), which we label “knowledge”, “openness”, 
“finance”, “governance” and “democracy”, respectively. We examine the levels and 
changes of each of these, emphasizing the extent to which the observed change 
contributes to convergence or, alternatively, divergence across countries. Finally we 
test for the impact on economic growth, controlling for a battery of  given conditions 
reflecting differences in geography, history etc.   
 
                                                 
1 Still another view, not considered in detail here,  is the “structuralist” one according to which 
development should be seen as a transformation process through which the industrial composition 
changes and overall productivity increase along the route. Measures of development based on this 
perspective (see UNIDO 2004) naturally focus on  the structure of output, the differing payoffs to 
success in different sectors/industries and the ability of a country to change its production structure 
towards the areas that are deemed to be the most promising. Successful catch-up and rapid structural 
change are no doubt closely related (Fagerberg 1996). But what is cause and what is effect? Attempts 
to explain the  superior productivity growth of catching-up economies compared to other countries as 
resulting from reallocation of resources from low productivity to high productivity industries have at 
best explained a small part of the actual difference (Fagerberg 2000). Hence, it seems more likely that 
rapid structural change and successful catch up are both outcomes of more generic factors of the type 
discussed in the remaining of this paper.   5
2. Catching up or falling behind? The stylized facts 
 
As a prelude to the main analysis we will in this section revisit some of the 
main facts about catching up and/or falling behind in the global economy  during the 
last two centuries. During most of the nineteenth century the United Kingdom was the 
leading capitalist country in the world, with a GDP per capita that was about 50 % 
above the average of other leading capitalist countries (Table 1). This lead was among 
other things related to the process of economic, social and institutional change that 
had taken place in Britain for quite some time already, the so-called industrial 
revolution (Von Tunzelmann 1995). However, during the second half of the century, 
the United States started to catch up with the United Kingdom and eventually - during 
the early part of the twentieth century - surpassed it. In retrospect it becomes clear that 
US growth was based on the development of a new technological system, based not so 
much on new products as on a new way to organize production and distribution 
(taylorism, fordism etc.).  The large productivity gains were secured through the 
development of large-scale production and distribution systems well suited for the 
large, fast-growing and relatively homogenous American market (Chandler 1990, 
Nelson and Wright 1992).   
  
That Europe initially failed to take advantage of these innovations is perhaps 
not so difficult to explain. For example, one main difference between the United 
States and Europe in the first half of this century relates to the size of markets. The 
European markets were smaller, and less homogenous.  Hence, it is not obvious that 
US methods, if applied to European conditions in this period, would have yielded 
superior results. This is what Abramovitz (1994a) has dubbed lack of “technological   6
congruence”. Two world wars and an intermediate period of protectionism and slow 
growth added to these problems (Abramovitz 1994a). Hence, the United States lead 
increased even further and peaked around 1950, when GDP per capita in the United 
States was about twice the European level. 
  
While the period between 1820 and 1950 was one of divergence in economic 
performance between leading capitalist countries, as reflected in the increase in the 
coefficient of variation of GDP per capita (Table 1), the decades that followed were 
characterized by convergence, at least as far as variables such as income or GDP per 
capita are concerned. The productivity gap between the United States and other 
developed countries was significantly reduced (cut by one half). Arguably, this 
reduction was related to the potential for rapid productivity advance through imitation 
of superior US technology. For instance, European production and exports in 
industries such as cars, domestic electrical equipment, electronics etc. grew rapidly 
from the 1950s onwards. The gradual reduction of barriers to trade within Europe 
from the 1950s onwards has generally been regarded an important contributing factor 
to this process, as have the general rise in incomes and living standards (Abramovitz 
1994, Maddison 1982,1991). 
  
European countries were not alone, however, in exploiting the window of 
opportunity given by superior US technology. From the 1950s onwards Japan, later 
joined by other Asian economies, aggressively targeted the very same industries as 
those that had grown rapidly in Europe (Johnson 1982, Wade 1990). Initially this did 
not give much reason for concern among policy makers or industrialists. But during 
the 1970s and 1980s it became evident that Japanese suppliers outperformed their   7
European and US competitors in many cases, and that this could not be explained 
solely by low wages. In became clear that the Japanese, as the Americans before 
them, have made important innovations in the organization of production, innovations 
that have led to both increased quality and higher productivity (Von Tunzelmann 
1995).   
 
While Europe, Japan and other countries started to catch up in many typical 
“American way of life” products, US industry leaped forward in another area; 
science-based industry. Before the First World War - and arguably in the interwar 
period as well - Europe, and Germany in particular, was at the forefront in this area.  
In fact, science based industry, characterized by high R&D investments,  highly 
educated (and qualified) labour and close interaction between industry, research 
institutes and universities, was largely a German invention. However, in the beginning 
of this century the US business community started to catch up in this area (Nelson and 
Wright 1992, Mowery and Rosenberg 1993). Technical universities and business 
schools were founded, often in close interaction with industry. This drive towards a 
greater reliance on science and R&D was much strengthened during the Second 
World War and the “cold war” that followed due to massive public investments in this 
area. As a consequence, the leadership passed to the United States.  
 
Gradually, however, European countries and Japan started to devote more 
resources to higher education, science and R&D. Following the Japanese example  
some of the Asian NICs started to invest massively in R&D from the seventies 
onwards. These changes have had a major impact on the structure of science based 
industry worldwide (see Fagerberg et al. 1999). Today the United States has been   8
replaced by Japan as the country that uses the largest share of its income on R&D 
activities, and the club of high R&D performers has been enlarged by a number of 
new members, Korea, Finland and Taiwan deserve particular mentioning (Fagerberg 
and Godinho 2004). However, many other countries, including the developing ones, 
remain low R&D performers. They also continue to lag on other aspects of great 
relevance for creation and exploitation of knowledge in the contemporary world, such 
as the spread of ICTs (Fagerberg et al. 1999,  Fagerberg et al. 2004).   
 
What  is perhaps most striking about this long-run evidence is the great 
variability across time and country groups. The nineteenth century was essentially a 
period characterized by increasing differences, e.g. divergence, and the two world 
wars during the first half of the twentieth century did not do much alleviate this trend. 
But after the end of the Second World War a period of convergence sets in, and this 
“post-war growth and convergence boom” – to use a term suggested by Moses 
Abramovitz -  lasted to around 1980. However, this trend was much more pronounced 
among the countries of the “west”, e.g., Western Europe and its “offshoots”  overseas 
(the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), than in the rest of the world.   
In fact, the most striking in Table 1 is the great variation in performance among 
countries with comparable initial levels of productivity and income. We will explore 
this issue further in the following, focusing on the period after 1960, for which we 
have more comprehensive data. These data, which cover more than 90 countries at 
different levels of development, are drawn from The Penn World Table (Heston, 
Summers and Aten 2002).  
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Table 1: GDP per capita over 1820-2003 (in 1990 USD) 
 
    Annual growth 
     
1820 1870 1910 1950 1970 1980 1990 2003 
1820-1950 1950-2003
The first-movers: 
Austria 1.2  1.9 3.5 3.7 9.7 13.8 16.9 20.8  0.9 3.4 
Belgium 1.3  2.7 4.2 5.5 10.6 14.5 17.2 21.1  1.1 2.6 
Denmark 1.3  2.0 3.9 6.9 12.7 15.2 18.5 22.8  1.3 2.3 
Finland 0.8  1.1 2.1 4.3 9.6 12.9 16.9 20.5  1.3 3.1 
France 1.2  1.9 3.5 5.3 11.7 15.1 18.1 21.3  1.1 2.7 
Germany 1.1  1.9 3.5 4.3 11.9 15.4 18.6 21.0  1.1 3.1 
Greece 0.7  0.9 1.6 1.9 6.2 9.0 10.0 13.5  0.8 3.8 
Italy 1.1  1.5 2.6 3.5 9.7 13.1 16.3 19.1  0.9 3.3 
Netherlands 1.8  2.8 4.0 6.0 11.9 14.7 17.3 21.4  0.9 2.5 
Norway 1.1  1.4 2.5 5.5 10.0 15.1 18.5 25.9  1.2 3.0 
Portugal 1.0  1.0 1.2 2.1 5.5 8.0 10.8 13.9  0.6 3.7 
Spain 1.1  1.4 2.3 2.2 6.3 9.2 12.1 16.5  0.6 4.0 
Sweden 1.2  1.7 3.1 6.7 12.7 14.9 17.7 21.6  1.3 2.3 
















United Kindgom  1.7  3.2 4.9 6.9 10.8 12.9 16.4 21.1  1.1 2.2 
Australia 0.5  3.6 5.7 7.4 12.0 14.4 17.1 23.1  2.1 2.2 
New Zealand  0.4  2.7 5.2 8.5 11.2 12.3 13.9 17.4  2.4 1.4 










United States  1.3  2.4 5.3 9.6 15.0 18.6 23.2 29.2  1.6 2.2 
China 0.6  0.5 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.1 1.9 4.4  -0.2 4.6 
India 0.5  0.5 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.3 2.2  0.1 2.4 
Indonesia 0.6  0.7 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.9 2.5 3.5  0.2 2.8 
Japan 0.7  0.7 1.3 1.9 9.7 13.4 18.8 21.7  0.8 4.8 
Malaysia ..  .. 0.9 1.6 2.1 3.7 5.1 8.5  .. 3.3 
Philippines ..  .. 1.1 1.1 1.8 2.4 2.2 2.6  .. 1.7 
Singapore ..  .. 1.3 2.2 4.4 9.1 14.4 21.7  .. 4.5 
South Korea  ..  .. 0.9 0.8 2.0 4.1 8.7 15.8  .. 6.0 
Taiwan ..  .. 0.7 0.9 3.0 5.9 9.9 17.3  .. 5.8 






Vietnam 0.5  0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 2.2  0.1 2.3 
Argentina ..  1.3 3.8 5.0 7.3 8.2 6.4 7.5  .. 0.8 
Brazil 0.6  0.7 0.8 1.7 3.1 5.2 4.9 5.4  0.7 2.3 
Chile ..  .. 2.7 3.8 5.3 5.7 6.4 10.4  .. 1.9 
Colombia ..  .. 1.2 2.2 3.1 4.3 4.8 5.3  .. 1.7 
Mexico 0.8  0.7 1.7 2.4 4.3 6.3 6.1 7.1  0.9 2.1 















Venezuela ..  0.6 1.1 7.5 10.7 10.1 8.3 7.0  .. -0.1 
Egypt ..  .. 0.7 0.9 1.3 2.1 2.5 3.0  .. 2.3 
Ghana ..  .. 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.4  .. 0.5 








South Africa  ..  .. 1.6 2.5 4.0 4.4 4.0 4.4  .. 1.1 
Czechoslovakia 0.8  1.2 2.1 3.5 6.5 8.0 8.5 9.6 1.1 2.0 
Hungary ..  1.3 2.1 2.5 5.0 6.3 6.5 8.0  .. 2.3 
















Soviet Union  0.7  0.9 1.5 2.8 5.6 6.4 6.9 5.4  1.1 1.2 
Continue on the next page 
The latecomers:   10
Continue from the previous page 
      1820 1870 1910 1950 1970 1980 1990 2003
The first-movers: 
Mean 1.1 2.0 3.6 5.6 10.9 13.9  16.8  20.8
Coeff. of variation  0.32 0.37 0.36 0.41 0.26 0.20  0.19  0.18
All countries (data fully available over 1820-2003): 
Mean 1.0 1.6 2.8 4.3 8.5 11.0  13.3  16.3
Coeff. of variation  0.38 0.55 0.57 0.63 0.52 0.49  0.50  0.49
All countries (data available only over 1910-2003): 
Mean .. .. 2.2 3.5 6.7 8.7  10.4  13.1
Coeff. of variation  .. .. 0.68 0.73 0.67 0.62  0.64  0.63
 
Source: Maddison (2001) and the Total Economy Database (GGDC 2005). 
 
 
Figure 1 plots annual average growth of GDP per capita over the period 1960-
2000 (horizontal axis)  against the level of GDP per capita in 1960 (vertical axis). 
Dashed lines represent sample averages (of growth and level, respectively).  In this 
way four quadrants emerge. The countries in the top left quadrant have a high initial 
GDP per capita level but grow relatively slowly; hence these countries may be said to 
“lose momentum”. In contrast, the countries in the top right quadrant continue to grow 
fast despite being relatively wealthy at the outset, these countries are “moving ahead”. 
In the bottom right quadrant we find countries that also grow above average but from 
a lower initial level, hence these are the countries that succeed in “catching up”. 
Finally we find in the bottom left quadrant countries with the least fortunate outcome, 
initially poor countries that grow slowly and therefore “fall behind”. 
    11




Source: Penn World Table Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002). 
 
It is obvious from the figure that there is a lot of diversity in performance; all 
four quadrants are in fact relatively well populated. But by closer inspection it is clear 
that there is a higher tendency for countries to cluster in the bottom left and top right 
quadrant than in the two other quadrants, consistent with a long-run tendency towards 
divergence in the global economy. The countries that fall behind are overwhelmingly 
African in origin while those that move ahead are mostly from the Western 
hemisphere (e.g., OECD countries). Those that succeed in catching up are mostly of 
Asian origin, including well-known examples such as Korea, Taiwan, China and 
Thailand (though some African countries also do relatively well). In contrast to the 
Asian experience, Latin-American economies tend to grow below average and cluster 
in the “losing momentum” category. However, there are several exceptions to this   12
trend; Brazil for instance grows faster than the average, as do some other Latin-
American economies. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present formal tests of the tendency towards convergence 
(divergence)  in GDP per capita across countries. In Table 2 growth of GDP per capita 
is regressed against its initial level (in log-form). A negative relationship would imply 
that rich countries (those with high levels of GDP per capita) tend to grow slower than 
the poorer ones, so called β-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). However, a 
positive association was found, for each decade as well as the period as a whole, 
indicating that high income countries on average grow faster than those with low 
income (divergence). The explanatory power is very low, though, consistent with the 
diversity in growth patterns observed in Figure 1. We also tested for the possibility 
that even though there is a tendency towards divergence across countries, there may 
still be convergence across people in different parts of the globe. This may happen if 
many large countries (such as China and the United States, for example) are on a 
converging path (in contrast to the vast majority of small countries). This hypothesis 
was rejected, however. 
   13
Table 2: The β-convergence hypothesis 
 
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1960-2000  Adjusted 
1960-2000 
Testing the convergence hypothesis:      
Constant  -1.21 -1.90 -3.29**  -2.77*  -0.31 -0.01*** 
  (0.64) (1.97) (2.19) (1.89) (0.26) (3.04) 
Log of the initial level  0.53**  0.50**  0.53***  0.48***  0.28*  0.55*** 
  (2.31) (2.14) (3.10) (2.91) (1.91) (6.54) 
R2  0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.92 
F-stat  5.36 4.56 9.59 8.47 3.66  42.82 
Number  of  countries  107 112 115 116 105 105 
Estimate without outliers:      
Constant  -2.20  -2.87*  -5.96***  -2.03** -2.04** -0.01*** 
  (1.55) (1.97) (5.67) (2.13) (2.09) (2.92) 
Log  of  the  initial  level 0.64*** 0.62*** 0.81*** 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 
  (3.68) (3.59) (0.12) (3.75) (2.96) (9.27) 
R2  0.09 0.09 0.19 0.07 0.11 0.85 
F-stat  13.55 12.90 44.98 14.08 15.68 85.99 
Number of countries  94  96  103  102  95  101 
 
Note: The last column gives results based on variables weighted by shares in world population in 1960. The 
dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita (constant 1996 USD) in % over the 
period; log of the initial year is natural logarithm of GDP per capita in the first year of the period; absolute value 
of robust t-statistics in brackets; DFITS statistics used to exclude outliers with a cut-off point at 
abs(DFITS)>2*sqrt(k/n); *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Source: Penn World Table Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002). 
 
 
While Table 2 tests for the tendency of poorer countries to grow faster than the 
richer ones (“catching up”), Table 3 investigates whether the distribution narrows or 
widens through time, so-called σ-convergence.
2  The results confirm, again, that for 
the sample as a whole the long-run tendency is towards divergence, and this tendency 
gains force after 1980.  But when the sample is divided into subgroups on the basis of 
the initial level of GDP per capita a more complex pattern emerges. For those in the 
richest quartile, there actually was a tendency towards convergence before 1980, after 
which a divergence trend sets in, consistent with the results for the smaller data-set 
included in Table 1. However, a similar tendency cannot be detected among the 
countries in the poorest quartile. For these countries the tendency points consistently 
towards divergence (though less so before the 1980s than later).  
                                                 
2 The number of observations differ between Tables 1-2 due to differences in data availability.   14
 
Table 3: The σ-convergence hypothesis 
 
    1960 1970 1980 1990  2000 
Number of countries  96 96 96 96  96 
Coefficient of variation (standard deviation / mean) 
All countries  0.948 0.959 0.952 1.017  1.057 
The richest quartile in 1960  0.304 0.279 0.271 0.329  0.367 
The poorest quartile in 1960  0.298 0.374 0.381 0.679  0.694 
Max / min country  39 61 50 54  91 
The richest to the poorest 
quartile in each period  11.3 13.8 16.0 20.0  24.1 
 
Note: GDP per capita (constant 1996 USD). 
Source: Penn World Table Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002). 
 
In the remaining of this paper we are going to focus on the most recent decade 
(1992-2002), for which we have better and more extensive data (including not only 
GDP per capita but also a range of factors that influence it). As is evident from the 
above, however, this period is by no means exceptional, but conforms to the long run 
pattern discussed above. Figure 2 plots the annual average growth of GDP per capita 
for 135 countries over the period 1992-2002 (horizontal axis) against the level of GDP 
per capita in 1992 (vertical axis). As for the entire period there is a lot of diversity in 
growth performance, with all four quadrants populated to some extent.  But, as above, 
there is a concentration of countries in the bottom left and top right quadrants, 
consistent with an overall tendency towards divergence in GDP per capita.   
   15




Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators). 
 
There are, as before, many African countries in the group that fall behind 
(bottom left), but these countries are now joined by a number of countries that 
formerly belonged to the USSR (so called “transition” countries). Most OECD 
member countries continue to be among those that move ahead (top right quadrant), 
but these countries are now joined by a number of former catch-up economies that 
due to their good performance in previous decades have moved closer to the frontier 
(Singapore, Korea and Taiwan are the most obvious examples but Botswana may also 
be mentioned). In addition this group also includes many of the former socialist 
economies that recently joined the European Union. The countries that catch up 
continue to be mainly of Asian origin joined by some African countries (and one 
single European country, namely Albania). Those that “lose momentum” (top left) are   16
more of a mixed bag, including some former USSR members, some Arab countries, 
some Latin-American countries and – closer to the average growth performance – 
some of the technologically leading countries in the world, such as Switzerland and 
Japan. 
 
To summarize, convergence appears to be a relatively “local” affair, 
constrained in time and space. The larger the sample, the weaker the converging 
trends appears to be. However, at any time some countries “make it”. In the following 
we are going to explore what distinguish those that succeed in catching up from those 
that fail. In so doing we will in particular focus on what the most relevant capabilities 
for catch-up are, following the literature on the subject, how these can be measured 
and what the empirical backing is for placing more emphasis on one type of capability 
as compared to another one. 
 
3. What are the most critical factors for catch-up? Taking stock of 
the literature. 
 
Intuitively, most people easily accept the idea that knowledge and economic 
development is intimately related, and hence that access to knowledge should be 
regarded as a vital factor. However, this is not the way different levels of development 
used to be explained by economists. From the birth of the so-called “classical political 
economy” – a term invented by Karl Marx - two centuries ago, what economists have 
focused on when trying to explain differences in income or productivity is 
accumulated capital per worker. Similarly, differences in economic growth have been 
seen as reflecting different rates of capital accumulation. This perspective arguably   17
reflects the important role played by “mechanization” as a mean for productivity 
advance during the so-called (first) industrial revolution, the period during which the 
frame of reference for much economic reasoning was formed. Closer to our own age 
Robert Solow adopted this perspective in his so-called “neoclassical growth theory” 
(Solow 1956). The theory predicted that, under otherwise similar circumstances, 
investments in poor countries (e.g. those with little capital) would be more profitable 
than in the richer ones, so that the former would be characterized by higher 
investment and faster economic growth than the latter. As a consequence of this logic, 
a narrowing of the development gap (so-called “convergence”) should be expected. 
 
It soon became clear, however, that this could not be the whole story. When 
students of economic growth started apply this perspective to long run growth 
processes in the USA and elsewhere, they found that capital accumulation, or factor 
accumulation more generally, could only explain a relatively small share of actual 
growth (Abramovitz 1956, see Fagerberg 1994 for an extended account). This finding 
has since been repeated many times for different data sets.
3 Moreover, as pointed out 
above, the prediction that global capitalist dynamics would be accompanied by a 
convergence in income and productivity between initially poor and rich countries was 
not borne out of the facts either. In fact, it is rare to see a prediction that is so 
completely rejected by the evidence as this one is. 
 
                                                 
3 Easterly and Levine (2001) provide a good overview of the more recent evidence on the subject.   18
From capital accumulation to institutions and geography 
 
It should be emphasized, however, that Solow’s theory was based on standard 
neoclassical assumptions on how markets and agents perform, which might not fit 
very well in developing countries. Hence, one possible explanation for the failure of 
many countries to catch up could be that markets did not work properly, agents did 
not receive the right incentives, government interfered too much in the economy etc., 
in short; that “the rules of the game” were not adhered to. Following the terminology 
used by Douglas North (1981) such rules are customary called institutions. However, 
in common parlance as well as in some scholarly work, the concept institutions is also 
used in a broader sense, to include not only rules and norms, but also organizations 
and other types of collaborative activities. In the sizeable empirical literature that has 
emerged on the subject, both definitions are in fact used, and this arguably contributes 
to confusion.  
Taking issue with the role of institutions for growth and development Glaeser 
et al. (2004) argue that institutions in the narrow sense of the term (rules, norms) 
should be assumed to be relatively stable over time. However, the authors point out 
that many indicators of “institutions” suggested in the recent scholarly literature are 
far from stable (rather volatile in fact). Hence, the authors argue that such indicators 
in most cases do not reflect “institutions” in the above sense, but political choices, 
policies pursued by governments etc. They also show that if the analysis is restricted 
to indicators of institutions in the narrow sense (reflecting constitution, judicial 
checks, etc.) and their relationship with levels and growth of GDP, the correlations are 
in fact rather weak, in contrast to what can be shown to hold for the more broadly 
defined “institutional variables” (which Glaeser et al. see as reflecting political   19
choices). Thus, institutions in the more narrow sense are not good predictors of 
successful catch-up. What seem to be of greater importance are the policies actually 
pursued.  Hence, the available econometric evidence seems to confirm what follows 
from casual observation, namely that the political and legal systems of successful 
countries (and unsuccessful ones as well) can differ a lot. There is no “one best way”. 
Catch-up friendly policies, it seems, may originate in very different political and legal 
systems (from communist China to democratic Ireland, to take just one example).
4    
  
In recent years, a sizeable empirical literature has also emerged trying to 
expand on the type of analysis just presented by pushing the search for explanatory 
factors far back in time, such as what kind of systems (countries) the colonial settlers 
came from (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001,2002), or by taking into account 
other types of exogenous variables that might have an impact on development (and 
policies), such as climate, exposure to diseases, geography (access to sea for 
instance), ethnic diversity etc. (Sachs et al. 2004, Masters and MacMillan 2001, 
Bloom et al. 2003, Alesina et al. 2003).  Arguably, it is difficult to deny that factors of 
a historical or geographical nature may have an impact on long-run growth. Hence, it 
appears pertinent to control for this when testing for the impact of other factors (such 
as different types of policy, for instance), and we will follow this practice here. 
However, it might be noted that in most cases there is conflicting evidence and 
interpretation about the impact of history, geography and nature on growth.
5 One 
reason for this may be that variables reflecting different causes sometimes are so 
strongly correlated that little can be said with certainty (apart from, perhaps, that there 
                                                 
4 However, successful catch up may feed back on the political and legal system, such as for instance the 
evidence from South Korea and Taiwan show. 
5 For instance, Glaeser et al. (2004) question the interpretation of the settler argument, suggesting that 
what the settlers brought with then was not so much their institutions as their human capital.   20
is a joint impact). Alesina et al. (2003), for instance, conclude on this basis that “In 
the end one has to use theory and priors to interpret our correlations” (p. 183).     
Another possibility, pointed out already by Moses Abramovitz (1994a), could be that 
the problems that such conditions give rise to, may also spur the creation of new 
knowledge and new social arrangements, which eventually may totally eliminate the 
problems (and even making society better off over a long-run).  This leads us to the 
role of knowledge in growth, to which we now turn. 
 
Knowledge, capabilities and development 
 
“Knowledge”, or “knowing things”, may take many forms. It may be 
theoretical, based on an elaborate understanding of the phenomena under scrutiny. But 
it may also be practical, based on, say, cause-effect relationships that have been 
shown to hold in practice, although a total understanding of the underlying causes 
may be lacking. It may be created through search or learning but it may also be 
acquired through education or training or simply by observing what others do and 
trying to imitate it. The creation (or acquisition) of knowledge does not require an 
economic motive (or effect), although this is quite common. The subset of knowledge 
that deals with how to produce and distribute goods and services, which is what 
interest economists most, is usually labelled “Technology”.
6 As a subject 
“technology” it is taught in engineering schools and technical universities. 
 
                                                 
6  An open question is if the concept technology only refers to knowledge about physical processes 
(“hardware”), or if it also includes knowledge about, say, how to organize/manage these (“software”). 
For our purpose the latter, broad interpretation of the term is the most meaningful. Arguably, mastery 
of physical processes is of dubious value if you don’t know how to embed these in a well-organized 
production and distribution system.      21
Traditionally, economic theorists have faced great problems in incorporating 
knowledge (technology) into their analysis of development. This had to do with a 
particular view on knowledge that had come to dominate economics; knowledge as a 
body of information, freely available to all interested, that can be used over and over 
again (without being depleted). Arguably, if this is what knowledge is about, it should 
be expected to benefit everybody all over the globe to the same extent, and cannot be 
invoked to explain differences in growth and development. 
   
It is understandable, therefore, that the first systematic attempts to 
conceptualise the relationship between knowledge and development did not come 
from the economics mainstream but from economic historians (who looked at 
knowledge or technology in a rather different way). Rather than something that exists 
in the public domain and can be exploited by anybody everywhere free of charge, 
technological knowledge, whether created through learning or organized R&D, is in 
this tradition seen as deeply rooted in the specific capabilities of private firms and 
their networks/environments, and hence not easily transferable. Compared with the 
traditional neoclassical growth theory discussed earlier these writers painted a much 
bleaker picture of the prospects for catch-up.  According to this latter view catch-up is 
not something that can be expected to occur only by market forces left alone, but 
requires a lot of effort and institution-building on the part of the backward country.   
 
The economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron set the stage for much of the 
subsequent literature (Gerschenkron 1962).
7 Some countries are at the technological 
frontier, he pointed out, while others lag behind. Although the technological gap 
                                                 
7 However, Thorstein Veblen (1915) is usually credited with initiating the approach. See Fagerberg and 
Godinho (2004) for details.    22
between a frontier country and a laggard represents “a great promise” for the latter (a 
potential for high growth through imitating frontier technologies), there are also 
various problems that may prevent backward countries from reaping the potential 
benefits to the full extent. His favourite example was the German attempt to catch up 
with Britain more than a century ago. When Britain industrialized, technology was 
relatively labour intensive and small scale. But in the course of time technology 
became much more capital and scale intensive, so when Germany entered the scene, 
the conditions for entry had changed considerably. Because this, Gerschenkron 
argued, Germany had to develop new institutional instruments for overcoming these 
obstacles, above all in the financial sector, “instruments for which there was little or 
no counterpart in an established industrial country”. He held these experiences to be 
valid also for other technologically lagging countries.  
 
Moses Abramovitz, arguing along similar lines, also placed emphasis on the 
potential for catch-up by late-comers. He defined it as follows: “This is a potential 
that reflects these countries’ greater opportunity to advance by borrowing and 
adapting the best practice technology and organization of more productive 
economies” (Abramovitz 1994b, p. 87). He suggested that differences in countries’ 
abilities to exploit this potential might to some extent be explained with the help of 
two concepts, technological congruence and social capability.
8 The first concept refers 
to the degree to which leader and follower country characteristics are congruent in 
areas such as market size, factor supply etc. As mentioned above, the technological 
system that emerged in the USA towards the end of the nineteenth century was highly 
depended on access to a large, homogenous market, something that hardly existed in 
                                                 
8 The term “social capability” comes from Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973).   23
Europe at the time, which may help to explain its slow diffusion there. The second 
concept points to the capabilities that developing countries have to develop in order to 
catch up, especially improving education (particularly technical) and the business 
infrastructure (including the financial system). Abramovitz explained the successful 
catch up of Western Europe in relation to the US in the first half of the post-WWII 
period as the result of both increasing technological congruence and improved social 
capabilities. As an example of the former he mentioned how European economic 
integration led to the creation of larger and more homogenous markets in Europe, 
facilitating the transfer of scale-intensive technologies initially developed for US 
conditions. Regarding the latter, he pointed among other things to such factors as the 
general increases in educational levels and how effective the financial system had 
become in mobilizing resources for change.  
 
  The concept “social capability” soon became very popular. Arguably, it is hard 
to find an applied paper on cross-country growth that does not reference it. But it is, 
as Abramovitz himself admitted, quite “vaguely” and “poorly” defined (Abramovitz 
1994a, p. 24 and 36) and this has left a wide scope for different  interpretations.   
However, although Abramovitz found it hard to measure, it is not true that he lacked 
clear ideas about what the concept was intended to cover. In fact he developed a long 
list of aspects that he considered to be particularly relevant:
9 
-  technical competence (level of education)  
-  experience in the organization and management of large scale enterprises 
-  financial institutions and markets capable of mobilizing capital on a large 
scale  
                                                 
9  This list is based on Abramovitz  (1986, p. 387-390) and, in particular, two papers he published 
during 1994, see Abramovitz (1994a p. 34-5, 1994b, p. 88).   24
-  honesty and trust   
-  the stability of government and its effectiveness in defining (enforcing) 
rules and supporting economic growth  
  
Another popular concept in the applied literature on growth and development 
that touches on some of the same issues is “absorptive capacity”. Wesley Cohen and 
Daniel Levinthal who suggested the term defined it as “the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to 
commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, p. 128). They saw it as largely 
dependent on the firm’s prior related knowledge, which in turn was assumed to reflect 
its cumulative R&D. However, they also noted that the path dependent nature of 
cumulative learning might make it difficult for a firm to acquire new knowledge 
created outside its own specialized field, and that it therefore was important for firms 
to retain a certain degree of diversity in its knowledge base through, among other 
things, nurturing linkages with holders of knowledge outside its own organization.  As 
with social capability it is not obvious how to measure it but the following dimensions 
seem to follow logically from Cohen and Levinthal’s discussion: 
-  (cumulative) research and development (R&D)  
-  diversity of knowledge base 
-  degree of openness/interaction across organizational boundaries 
 
Although their focus was on firms, many of the same considerations seem to 
apply at more aggregate levels, such as regions or countries, and the concept has won 
quite general acceptance. It should be noted, however, that the concept by definition 
collapses three different processes into one, namely (1) search, (2) assimilation (or   25
absorption) of what is found and (3) its commercial application.  Hence, it refers not 
only to “absorption” in the received meaning of the term, but also on the ability to 
exploit and create knowledge more generally.  The authors, being well aware of this, 
defend their position by arguing - with reference to relevant psychological literature - 
that the ability to assimilate existing and the ability to create new knowledge are so 
similar so there is no point in distinguishing between them (ibid, p. 130). However, 
Zahra and George (2002), in a review of the literature, argue out that the skills 
required for creating and managing knowledge differ from those related to its 
exploitation and that the two therefore deserve to be treated and measured separately. 
They term the latter “transformative capacity”. Kim (1997) equates absorptive 
capacity with “technological capability” and identifies three different aspects of it; 
innovation capability, investment capability and production capability. In a similar 
vein Fagerberg (1988) and Fagerberg, Knell and Srholec (2004) distinguish between a 
country’s ability to compete on technology (what they term technology 
competitiveness) and its ability to exploit technology commercially independently of 
where it was first created (so-called capacity competitiveness). 
    
Social capital and development 
 
Four decades ago Irma Adleman and Cynthia Morris (1965) concluded, on the 
basis of an in-depth study of a number of indicators on development for a large 
number of countries, that “the purely economic performance of a community is 
strongly conditioned by the social and political setting in which economic activity 
takes place” (p. 578). Although, this important insight largely got lost in the years that 
followed, during the nineties interests in the social (societal) prerequisites for   26
economic development and catching-up rebounded. In an important contribution, 
aimed at explaining to the marked gap in economic development between two Italian 
regions, Robert Putnam (1993) put forward the argument that this gap had to do with 
different capacities for responding to social and economic challenges through 
appropriate forms of collective action. Such differences (in the capacity for collective 
action) did according to Putnam reflect historically given differences in social norms, 
networking and civic engagements, or “social capital” as he puts it, using an already 
established sociological term (Coleman 1990).  
 
Although this interpretation of history was received by little enthusiasm by the 
policy makers of the lagging region, who saw it as advocacy for historical 
determinism and hence not very helpful in practice (Putnam 1993), it contributed to a 
rapidly increasing body of research on the role of social capital in development. 
Michael Woolcock and Deepa Narayan of the World Bank, in a recent survey 
(Woolcock and Narayan 2000), defines social capital as “norms and networks that 
enable people to act collectively”. However, as they and other contributors to this 
literature point out, dense local networks are in themselves no guarantee for 
development. To take just one example, the participants in a local Mafia may be well 
connected, but their activities can hardly be said to be socially beneficial. More 
generally, groups of strongly connected people may be very dynamic, outward 
oriented and conducive for the creation of new and more efficient economic 
arrangements to the mutual benefit of all concerned. But they may also be 
conservative, inward looking, conflict oriented and act as a constraint for engagement 
in socially constructive collaborative activities. Therefore, it is pointed out, strong 
ties, keeping the participants of a group together (so-called “bonding”), need to be   27
complemented by a web of weaker ties to a more diverse set of external actors (so-
called “bridging”) to ensure balanced, socially efficient outcomes. A central theme in 
the policy relevant literature on the subject has thus become what governments can do 
to support the creation of trust and strengthen constructive collaboration across 
different (social, political, religious, ethnic etc.) groups (see Woolcock and Narayan 
2000). 
 
The fact that the type of factors taken up by the literature on social capital may 
matter for economic development is widely accepted. For instance, Kenneth Arrow 
pointed out more than three decades ago that “It can plausibly be argued that much of 
the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by lack of mutual 
confidence” (Arrow 1972, p. 357). The importance of honesty and trust was, as 
mentioned previously, also emphasized by Abramovitz (1994b). The problem is rather 
how to measure and influence such factors. The inherent measurement problems 
probably explain why there is not yet a large empirical literature focusing on the 
impact of social capital on economic growth and development. One possible source of 
information that has been exploited to throw some light on the issue is the “World 
Value Survey”. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer used such data to analyse the 
relationship between trust, norms of civic behaviour and membership in groups on the 
one hand and economic growth on the other for a sample of 29 (mostly developed) 
countries (Knack and Keefer 1997).  They found trust and civic behaviour to be 
positively related to investment and economic growth.
10 However, in contrast to some 
of the assertions in the literature this did not extend to membership in groups or 
organizations (which is perhaps not so surprising given that not all types organizations 
                                                 
10 Trust and civic behavior were also found to be positively related to the degree of income equality and 
ethnic homogeneity.   28
should necessarily be expected to have beneficial economic effects, cf. the Mafia-
example above).  
 
There are, however, continuing problems with this way of  measuring of social 
capital. One important deficiency is the very restrictive coverage in terms of countries 
and time span.  An alternative way to approach social capital and its role in economic 
development has been suggested by Jonathan Temple and Paul Johnson (Temple 
1998, Temple and Johnson 1998). Their approach is a continuation of the pioneering 
work by Adleman and Morris during the 1960s (mentioned above), aimed at exploring 
the interrelationship between economic, social and political forces in development. 
Adleman and Morris saw economic development as contingent on broader social and 
political changes accompanying the transition from a traditional (rural) ways of life, 
based on high degree of self-sufficiency, to a modern industrialized society 
characterized by market-relationships and new forms of institutions and governance. 
They therefore set out to identify (and measure) a wide set of indicators (twenty-two 
in total) of economic, social and political modernization, drawing on a number of 
different sources, for a large group of developing countries. The relationships between 
these various indicators were then explored through so-called factor analysis. It was 
shown that the variation in the data could be reduced to four common factors, one of 
which was deemed especially significant. This factor, an amalgam of structural factors 
(share of agriculture, urbanization etc.), socio-economic characteristics (role of 
middle class, social mobility, literacy etc.) and the development of mass 
communication (measured through the spread of newspapers and radios in the 
population), is what Temple and Johnson suggest using as a measure for what they 
chose to call “social capability” which, they argue, embraces “social capital”. Note   29
that Temple (1998) tends to use the terms “social capability”, “social capital” and 
“social arrangements” interchangeably.    
 
As is common in the applied growth literature Temple and Johnson (1998) 
include their measure of “social capability” or “social capital”, which they term 
“SOCDEV”, as one of the independent variables in a regression on subsequent 
economic growth (together with initial GDP per capita and other variables that were 
deemed relevant). They demonstrate that the SOCDEV index has considerable 
explanatory power for the observed differences in growth performance. This result 
was found to be robust to the inclusion of a number of other factors. But when so-
called “policy-variables” - shorthand for accumulation of physical and human capital 
among other things - were introduced, the significance and explanatory power of the 
SOCDEV variable decreased somewhat, arguably indicating that a lot of its impact 
may be through its influence on how policies are shaped. These findings are 
suggestive. However,  it also has to be acknowledged that the SOCDEV index is a 
mixed bag of different types of variables, of which some arguably have little to do 
with “social” factors. Arguably, we still lack a satisfactory measure of “social capital” 
that covers a broad range of countries.  
    30
4. Bringing the pieces together: the framework and indicators 
 
The literature in this area has identified a number of different mechanisms that 
developing countries may exploit to catch up. Some of these are easily measurable, 
while others are much harder to quantify. Is it possible to embed the variety of 
mechanism and indicators suggested in the literature in a common framework? To 
start with it is worth noting that many contributions in this area, despite theoretical 
differences, share a common empirical framework. This framework, so-called Barro-
regressions, consists of regressing economic growth against initial GDP per capita and 
a number of other factors that may be deemed relevant (for a cross-country sample). 
In this framework the GDP per capita variable measures the scope for catch-up (or 
convergence). The other variables represent factors that are assumed to be of 
importance for  (e.g. “condition” ) the ability  to exploit  the scope for catch-up (or 
convergence).  Hence in the literature these factors are often dubbed “conditional 
factors”, and the growth-regressions with these factors included are interpreted as 
tests of so-called “conditional convergence”. In contrast to the (absolute) convergence 
(or divergence) discussed in section 2 of this paper, which refer to observable 
empirical patterns, “conditional convergence” is not directly observable. The reason is 
that the potential for catch-up that it refers to may be masked by  unfavourable 
“conditional factors” (which hence need to be controlled for in order to assess the true 
potential). 
 
Although named after Robert Barro (1991), he did not invent this framework. 
Arguably, the first to introduce this technique was John Cornwall (1976), who was 
inspired by Schumpeter’s  emphasis on creation and diffusion of technology as the    31
source of  economic development. In contrast to many recent exercises in this area, 
Cornwall had a clear argument for the inclusion of GDP per capita as an explanatory 
variable; it represented the gap in technology between  frontier and the late-comer 
countries. As such it represented a potential for high growth in the latter through 
successful imitation of superior technology developed elsewhere. This argument was 
subsequently refined by the so-called “technology gap approach” to economic growth 
(Fagerberg 1987, 1988 ,Verspagen 1991). This approach, distinctly Schumpeterian in 
flavour, emphasized the dynamic character of technology gaps. Such gaps, it was 
argued, are not only exploited (through imitation) but also created (through 
innovation). Following this view,  any analysis of the evolving global income 
distribution has to be based a thorough understanding of innovation-diffusion at a 
global scale and the factors underpinning this dynamics.   
 
The above arguments are of course firmly based on what we have called the 
knowledge-based approach. This approach, in our view, provides a general framework  
that is consistent with the existing empirical work in this area  and flexible enough to 
accommodate the other – to some extent more partial - arguments that  have been 
raised in the literature. We restate it as follows:  
1.  Development is about increasing knowledge and capabilities along several 
complementary dimensions. 
2.  Countries facing a knowledge gap may get an extra bonus from the possibility 
to imitate more advanced knowledge already in place elsewhere. 
3.  The exploitation of this potential is, however, contingent on increasing the 
countries own level knowledge and (social) capabilities.   32
4.  As the distance to the frontier declines, the importance of the ability to create 
new knowledge, e.g., to innovate, increases relative to other factors.  
 
Based on the preceding discussion Figure 3 presents an overview of the factors 
that we expect to be of particular relevance for catch-up, along with possible 
indicators of these factors. Starting from the bottom we first have factors related to 
differences in geography and nature. Such factors are important for development, 
especially at an early stage, and are therefore important to take into account, although 
there is not much one can do about it.
11 This also holds, to a large extent, for social 
characteristics that are the result of historical processes in the distant past, such as the 
roles of language(s), religion(s), ethnic groupings etc. As a consequence we do not 
include these in what we call the “policy space”, shorthand for factors that within a 
reasonable time frame can be shaped through policy interventions. It is also debatable 
whether what is termed institutions belong to this policy space. For instance, the 
differences across regions in attitudes towards social collaboration studied by Putnam 
(and labelled “social capital”), were shown to have their roots way back in history 
(and to be remarkably persistent). Depending on the time frame, however, there is a 
lot of scope for improvements in the organization of society, the formulation/ 
implementation of rules/regulations, policies etc., and we therefore include such 
aspects in our definition of the policy space. In this we also include what Moses 
Abramovitz termed social capabilities, e.g., organizational competence, adequate 
financial infrastructure, education etc., and factors associated with technological 
capability (absorptive capacity) such as R&D infrastructure.   
 
                                                 
11 However, with increasing knowledge, the social and economic effects of such given conditions may 
change (learning to cope with diseases, for instance).   33





Figure 3 also gives some hints on measurable aspects of the dimensions in 
question. Technological capability refers to the ability to develop new goods and 
services and new production methods. It is closely related to the innovation system of 
a country (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993). We have three sources of data, which 
capture different aspects of this dimension. On the input side, research and 
development (R&D) expenditures, measure some (but not all) resources that are used   34
for developing new products or processes. On the output side, number of patents
12 
count (patentable) inventions while articles published in scientific and technical 
journals reflect the quality of a country’s science base (on which innovation and 
invention activities to some extent depend).
13  In addition, a well-developed ICT 
infrastructure is widely acknowledged as a critical factor for the ability to benefit from 
new technology. We use three indicators of ICT diffusion in the economy: personal 
computers, Internet users and fixed/mobile phone subscribers. Another important 
aspect of the growing global technological competition is the increasing role played 
by quality standards for which the ISO 9000 certification seems to be most relevant 
and broadly available indicator.  
 
 As  for  social capability the importance of education (or human capital) for 
assimilation and creation of knowledge goes almost without saying. We include five 
indicators that reflect different aspects. On the one hand the focus is on broad 
measures of human capital; the number of years in school, the teacher-pupil ratio in 
primary education and life expectancy. The teacher-pupil ratio is included to reflect 
the qualitative dimension of education, while life expectancy at birth is included as a 
measure of the time horizon for individual investments in education. On the other 
hand emphasis is placed on higher education as reflected in the share of population 
with completed higher education and the rate of enrolment in tertiary education. Note 
that we do not use indicators of enrolment in primary and secondary education, since 
these are measures of flows, that may not have any impact on the labour force within 
                                                 
12 We use only patents granted in the United States to assure consistency in terms of criteria for 
novelty, originality, etc. 
13 We consider both patent and article counts as very reliable sources quantitative data. Note, however, 
that the propensity to patent or publish varies considerably across scientific fields and sectors/industries 
and that many innovations are not registered by these means. Moreover, there can be an upward 
language/regional bias for English-speaking nations and/or countries with a close links to the United 
States. No attempt was made to correct for these possible biases.   35
the time span considered here, and have upper boundaries (“saturation” levels) that 
imply that most developed countries will have values close to 100%. Indicators with 
the latter property are not well suited in factor analysis, because they tend to cluster 
into a single dimension due to this property alone, regardless of the economic content.
  
However, this problem is less severe for enrolment in tertiary education than for other 
enrolment indicators, which  is why we include it here.  
 
As pointed out in the literature on absorptive capacity, openness (or 
interaction) across country borders may serve as an important channel of technology 
transfer (or spillovers) from abroad. This issue is also very much emphasized in work 
inspired by the so-called “new growth theories” (see, for instance, Grossman and 
Helpman 1991 and Coe and Helpman 1995).  Four channels of technology transfer 
across country borders have been examined in the literature: migration, licensing, 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) (for an overview see Cincera and van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2001). However, due to lack of data we only take into 
account the two latter, e.g.; diffusion of technology embodied in (merchandise) 
imports and (stock) of inward FDI. 
 
  The crucial role of country’s financial system for mobilizing resources for 
catching-up has been emphasized repeatedly. We capture this aspect by the amount of 
credit (to the private sector) and by capitalization of companies listed in domestic 
capital markets. These quantitative measures are complemented by the interest rate   36
spread (lending rate minus deposit rate), which is included as a measure of the 
efficiency of the financial system.
14  
 
  The importance of institutions, governance and policies, furnishing 
economic agents with incentives for creation and diffusion of knowledge, is generally 
acknowledged in the literature. Although such factors often defy “hard” measurement, 
especially in a cross-country comparison, there exist some survey-based measures that 
may be considered here.
15 We include the following aspects (taken from such 
surveys):  
-    Adherence to human rights (freedom from extra judicial killing, torture, 
imprisonment, etc.)  
-  impartial courts,  
-  law and order,  
-  protection of property rights,  
-  how difficult it is to start/operate a business,  
-  size of informal market (extent of corruption),  
-  democratic versus autocratic government,  
-  checks an balances in the political system,  
-  degree of competition for posts in the executive and legislature and 
-  the extent of political rights and civil liberties.  
                                                 
14 Another indicator, suggested by Clague et al. (1999), not included in our analysis due to lacking data  
for European countries, is “contract intensive money” (CIM) which reflects the trust in the legal and 
financial system of a country. 
15 The sources of the data include expert panels and surveys provided by the Transparency 
International, Amnesty International, Freedom House, World Economic Forum, PRS Group, Economic 
Intelligence Unit, Polity IV Project, various U.S. based State Agencies and others (see the Appendix 
A1 for details).   37
These indicators clearly refer to institutions both in the broad sense (“quality of 
governance”) and in the narrow sense (“rules of the game”). One of the challenges in 
the following will be to find ways to distinguish between these two aspects.
16 
 
Note that we do not use the composite “governance matters” indicators 
developed by the World Bank, which provide composite measures of “voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, control of corruption” for a large sample of countries between 1996 and 2002. 
However, the sources for the World Bank indicators are by and large the same as 
those utilized here, so most of the information included in the World Bank indicators 
is taken into account. The reason is, as explained by Kaufmann et al (2003, pp. 31), 
that these indicators by construction eliminate the time trend in the data, such as for 
instance a general trend towards more (less) democratic government (which clearly 
would be of interest here). However, as pointed by Glaeser et al. (2004), time-trends 
may be problematic, since it cannot be excluded that the perceptions of the 
respondents may also be influenced by factors other than the issue in question. Hence 
the resulting indicators have to be interpreted with care. 
 
Measurability is a key issue, of course, but data availability proved to be an 
even more serious concern for the large sample of countries considered here (135 
countries). The relatively short time frame (1992-2002) allowed us to include a swarm 
of newly independent - former centrally planned - countries emerging from the break 
up of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. However,  in spite of this short time 
frame, there were some missing observations for certain indicators/countries,   
                                                 
16 Unfortunately, we cannot use indicators on constitutional rules and judicial independence proposed 
by La Porta, et al (2004) due to the limited country coverage (only up to 71 countries) and availability 
(only in 1995).    38
especially for the initial period. In general, a fully complete data set was available for  
one third of the countries only, another third was in the 90-99% range, while the 
remaining  had between 70-90% of the data needed.
17 Typically, most developed 
market economies  figure prominently among those with full coverage, while  many 
developing countries and former socialist economies lacked data on some 
indicators/years. Since the purpose of the analysis was to explore trends for a broad 
sample of countries, including many developing ones, we chose to estimate the 
missing observations with the help of information on other, similar, variables/ 
countries (rather than reducing the sample).
18 Hence the main focus of the analysis is 
on the overall dynamics, and on groups of countries with similar characteristics, rather 
than on the development of specific countries/indicators. To ensure comparability 
over time and across countries, all indicators were measured in real units (quantity), 
deflated (if applicable) with population or GDP and on an increasing scale (from low 
score (weak) to high score (strong)).
19  To limit the influence of shocks occurring in 
specific years, we express all indicators as three-year averages for the initial period 
over 1992-1994 and for the final period over 2000-2002.     
 
5.  Constructing composite indicators: factor analysis 
 
The total number of indicators taken into account here equals twenty-nine 
(excluding indicators related to geography, nature and history). Hence there is 
potentially a lot of information to exploit in the analysis. But it goes without saying 
that it would not be meaningful to take all these variables on board in, say, a 
                                                 
17 Only 11 countries, mostly former Soviet republics, had less than 80 % of the observations required. 
18 See Appendix A1 for details on how this was done. 
19 If necessary we reversed scale of the indicators to have all of them in an increasing order, e.g. we use 
teacher pupil ratio instead of the opposite.   39
regression analysis on economic growth, since many of them reflect slightly different 
aspects of the same reality and tend to be highly correlated (hence multicollinearity 
may be expected). How to combine this information into a smaller number of 
dimensions with a clear-cut economic interpretation? This is one of the key the 
challenge confronting us in this study. 
 
The most widely used approach to construct composite indicators is to use 
judgment to select the relevant variables and then weigh these together (normally 
using equal weights). This requires that we know in forehand which indicators to 
combine into a single dimension. However, if we lack this knowledge, this way of 
doing things runs into problems, as appears to be case here.  Fortunately there is a 
well-developed branch of multivariate analysis, so-called “factor analysis”
  (or 
principal components analysis), that is designed to advice on questions like this.
20 It is 
based on the very simple idea that variables referring to the same dimension are likely 
to be correlated, and that we may use this insight to reduce the complexity of a data 
set (consisting of many variables) into a small number of uncorrelated composite 
variables, each reflecting a specific dimension of the total variance of the data set. 
This method has been widely used in the social sciences for a long time (Spearman 
1904, Hotelling 1933) and was applied to the study of development in the pioneering 
study by Adleman and Morris (1965, 1967).  
  
The aim of factor analysis is to reduce a complex set of variables into a small 
number of  (principal) factors that account for a high proportion of variance. First a 
matrix of correlations is computed. We then identify a vector explaining as much as 
                                                 
20 For a brief overview see Kline (1994).   40
variance in the matrix as possible and extract it from the data. This procedure is 
repeated as long as the last factor identified explains more of the total variance than an 
original variable (more than the inverse value of the number of variables).
21  The 
result of this iterative process is a set of new (latent) variables that are linear 
combinations of the underlying indicators. 
   
The problem, of course, is how to interpret the retained factors. In doing so it 
is helpful to look at the correlations with the original set of variables (the so-called 
“factor loadings”). These “factor loadings” show the proportion of the total variance 
of an original variable that is accounted for by the new composite factor, e.g., a 
loading 0.60 of a variable indicates that 36% of its variance is explained by the 
composite factor. The first factor identified typically explains by far the largest 
proportion of the variance, with most of the variables highly loaded in it. However, 
such a general factor - with many high loadings - is difficult to interpret.   
Furthermore, it is an artefact of the method that the general factor is followed by a 
series of bipolar factors with mixed positive and negative loadings, the interpretation 
of which are even more difficult.  Therefore, in a second step of the factor-analysis we 
rotate the solution to maximize differences in loadings of the original variables across 
the extracted factors.
22 After the rotation, only a limited number of variables will load 
                                                 
21 In the factor analytic terminology its “eigenvalue” should be higher than unity. This simple rule 
ensures that we will end up with less principal factors than the original number of variables. Note that 
the eigenvalue is sum of squares of the factor loadings of each factor. If divided by the number of 
variables, it reflects the proportion of variance explained by the factor (the last row in Table 4).   
22 A number of computational methods have been developed for factor analysis and rotation. In the 
following, we will apply principal component analysis and normalized varimax rotation. Note that we 
have also computed results for more sophisticated extraction methods and rotations (such as maximum 
likelihood factor analysis and (bi)quartimax rotation, etc.), but the solutions are broadly the same, so 
that we report only results of the former methods.   41
high on each factor, which simplifies the interpretation.
23  This second step also 
provides us with the weights used to calculate the composite indicators ( the “factor 
score coefficients”). 
   
The composite indicators that follow from weighing together the original 
variables with the “factor score coefficients” (so-called “factor scores”) are 
uncorrelated with each other, which is of course a highly desirable property in 
regression analysis. However, since each factor score is a linear combination of all the 
original variables (although only a few of them may have high weights),  doubts may 
be expressed about the interpretation. To reduce such interpretation problems one 
possibility might be to only take into account those original variables that load highly 
when constructing a particular indicator (and disregard the other, less important 
variables). For instance, one might chose to include only those original variables for 
which the factor loadings are shown to be significantly different from zero at, say, a 1 
% level of significance.
24  Alternatively one might allow each original variable to be 
included in only one of the composite indicators, which would of course be preferable 
for an interpretation point of view. Note, however, that one less desirable consequence 
in this way may be that the property of uncorrelatedness may no longer apply.   
 
 Before we move to the results from the factor analysis there are some issues 
that deserve mentioning. First, the indicators have to be standardized (deducting mean 
and dividing by standard deviation) before aggregating them into a composite.  We 
                                                 
23 Note that the rotation changes factor loadings (meaning of the factors) and distribution of the 
accounted variance across the factors, but it cannot change the amount of total variance explained by 
the solution. 
24 A correlation is significant if is it higher that is likely to occur by chance. The significance level of 
correlation coefficient depends on sample size. In a sample of 270 observations, an absolute value of 
the correlation coefficient above 0.15 is significantly different from zero at 1% level, which is the 
threshold used in the following.   42
have standardized the indicators with the mean and standard deviation of the pooled 
data (from the initial and final period). This means that the change of a composite 
indicator over time will reflect both changes in each country’s relative position 
(across countries) and changes in the absolute level of the underlying variables (over 
time). Second,  variables should be relatively evenly distributed, e.g., variables with a 
“two sample split” (for example very high values for the developed countries and 
close to zero for the poorer ones) should be avoided. For the very same reason outliers 
need to be dealt with. Simply excluding outliers from the sample may not be the best 
solution, as we then may lose the important evidence (countries).  A log-
transformation of the data set was used to significantly reduce these problems.
 25  
 
In Table 4  we present the results from a factor analysis on pooled data for the 
initial and final period for the 135 countries covered by the analysis (270 
observations). The table presents the factor loadings after rotation and the 
corresponding factor score coefficients. Entries in bold represent significant 
correlation coefficients (absolute value above 0.15). The shaded areas show the 
variables associated with the various factors (composite indicators) when only one 
link is allowed between a variable and a factor (composite indicator).  
 
                                                 
25 Some variables containing zeros or negative scale had to be rescaled to positive values. We used a 
simple rule by adding the minimum observed value in the sample, which delivers the transformation, to 
all of the observations in the sample.   43
Table 4: Results of factors analysis 
Factor loadings  Factor score coefficients 
Number of observations = 270 
(factor analysis of 135 countries on pooled data for the 



















































































































Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)  0.77 -0.19  0.30  0.25  0.14  0.13 -0.16  0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
USPTO patents (per capita)  0.65  -0.01  0.46 0.36 0.28 0.05  -0.07  0.08 0.01 0.00 
Science & engineering articles (per capita)  0.69  -0.06  0.42 0.35 0.15  0.08  -0.09  0.06 0.02  -0.04 
Personal computers (per capita)  0.62 0.23 0.46 0.21 0.39 0.04 0.07 0.10  -0.07 0.03 
Internet users (per capita)  0.50 0.43 0.35  -0.01  0.47  0.04 0.20 0.09  -0.16  0.06 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per capita)  0.81 0.24 0.28 0.21 0.30 0.13 0.09  -0.03  -0.05  -0.01 
ISO 9000 certifications (per capita)  0.55 0.33 0.52 0.14  0.37  0.02 0.14 0.16  -0.11  0.02 
Tertiary school enrolment (% gross)  0.89  0.01 0.14 0.15 0.26  0.19  -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 
Teacher-pupil ratio in primary education  0.83  0.06 0.12 0.24  0.01  0.19  0.00 -0.11  0.01  -0.08 
Life expectancy at birth  0.82  0.03  0.21 0.17 0.15  0.16  -0.02  -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Average schooling years in population  0.87  0.11 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.19  0.03 -0.13 -0.01 -0.03 
Share of higher school complete in population  0.86  0.00 0.05 0.12 0.24  0.20  -0.04 -0.14 -0.04 -0.01 
Merchandise imports (% of GDP)  0.04  0.78  -0.06  0.22  -0.11 0.00 0.46  -0.11  0.09  -0.09 
FDI inward stock (% of GDP)   -0.02  0.77  0.15 -0.02  0.25 -0.06  0.43  0.06 -0.08  0.02 
Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate)  -0.09  0.05  -0.72 -0.16 -0.06 0.11 0.07  -0.37 0.08 0.02 
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP)  0.33  0.13  0.74  0.14 0.10  -0.05  0.03  0.33  -0.12 -0.04 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  0.39  0.06  0.68 0.30 0.25  -0.05  -0.02  0.25 -0.04  0.00 
Physical integrity human rights  0.25 0.38  -0.07  0.69  0.12  0.00 0.19  -0.24  0.31  -0.04 
Impartial courts  0.14  -0.01  0.53  0.61  0.03 -0.10 -0.05  0.16  0.18  -0.04 
Law and order  0.38  0.06  0.27  0.52  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.16  -0.06 
Property rights  0.30  0.01  0.41  0.71 0.22  -0.06  -0.06  0.03  0.23 0.00 
Regulation  0.35  0.01  0.32  0.65  0.11  -0.02  -0.05  -0.01  0.22  -0.03 
Informal Market (corruption)  0.32 0.20 0.51 0.58  0.10  -0.06 0.07 0.11 0.14  -0.05 
Index of democracy and autocracy  0.15  0.04  0.08  0.10  0.90  -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02  0.24 
Political constraint  0.17  -0.06 0.10 0.25  0.76 -0.05 -0.10 -0.04  0.06  0.20 
Legislative index of political competitiveness  0.25  0.08 0.12  -0.15 0.79 0.00  -0.01 0.03  -0.16 0.21 
Executive index of political competitiveness  0.21  0.15 0.13  -0.07 0.85 -0.03  0.03 0.02  -0.12 0.22 
Political rights  0.18  -0.01 0.06 0.51  0.78 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12  0.19  0.19 
Civil liberties  0.18  0.06 0.08 0.57  0.72 -0.08 -0.04 -0.12  0.22  0.17 
Explained % of total variance  26.8  6.6  12.9  13.2  17.2 .. .. .. .. .. 
Note: Extraction method: principal components; rotation : varimax normalized; the highest loading for each variable marked by grey shading; significant 
loadings (at 1% level) in bold. 
Source: See Appendix A1.   44
 
Five principal factors were retained, which jointly explain 76.7% of the total variance. 
The first factor correlates highly with various aspects associated with creation, use and 
transmission of knowledge, e.g.;  R&D and innovation, scientific publication, ICT 
infrastructure, ISO 9000 certifications and education. Hence we label it knowledge. The 
second factor may be labelled “openness” (as it shows high correlation with imports and 
inward FDI) and the third factor may be similarly labelled “financial system”.  A brief look at 
the remaining two factors reveals that the above mentioned difference between “governance” 
and “policy outcomes” on the one hand and “rules of the game” on the other are clearly 
mirrored in the results. In fact, the fourth factor loads highly with variables reflecting the 
“governance” dimension, while the fifth factor reflects aspects of the political system, and we 
shall call it “democracy” in the following.   
 
In the following we will concentrate mainly on the cases with one original variable per 
composite factor, since this makes the interpretation of the factors easier. Comparing the case 
with one variable per factor with that of significant loadings reveals that the meanings of the 
factors change quite a bit, although the broad characteristics given above may still hold. This 
change is especially significant for the openness factor, which in addition to FDI and imports 
would also include aspects related to internet use, adherence to international quality standards 
(ISO 9000) and human rights. Of course, these additional variables may still merit as aspects 
of “openness” albeit in a broader sense than previously.  The same goes to some extent for the 
“financial system”  which would also take on board aspects related to science and technology, 
spread of computers, adherence to international quality standards and the working of the legal 
system (impartial courts and extent of corruption).  Similar considerations apply for the 
governance factor. Hence, using significant loadings creates partly overlapping but not   45
necessarily less meaningful  factor definitions. We may chose to use these estimates test for 
the sensitivity of changing the factor definitions by including a broader range of potentially 
relevant variables.   
 
The results suggest that the factors identified in the literature can be summarized along 
five dimensions:   
-  knowledge 
-  openness to technology/knowledge from abroad 
-  the development of the financial system 
-  quality of governance 
-  degree of democracy 
The first and second terms together arguably comes close to what is normally meant with 
“absorptive capacity”. In contrast, the third and fourth dimension (finance and quality of 
governance)  clearly belong to “social capability” in Abramovitz’ sense. But so does much of 
what is included in the “knowledge” term, especially when account is taken of the very high 
weights for the educational variables.  The fifth term, degree of democracy, does not belong 
to any of the above sets but figures prominently in what we dubbed the “institutional” 
approach. However, “Social capital”, in the tradition from Putnam, is not reflected here due to 
lack of adequate data sources, which might be seen as a weakness (but one that is difficult to 
remedy with the available data).     46
 
6. Stylised facts on the critical factors of catching-up 
 
In this section we explore, mainly with the help of graphs, the “stylised facts” that  
emerge from an analysis of  the levels and changes over time of the five composite 
variables/capabilities. The first thing to note is the very high correlation between the level of 
income of a country and its level of knowledge (Figure 4). In fact, the latter explain 77 % of 
the former, a very high number indeed.  The main source of deviation comes from a group of 
small natural-resource rich countries (such as United Arab Emirates, Oman and Botswana) , 
which all  have higher levels of income that follow form their levels of knowledge, and from a 
group of former Soviet countries for which it is the other way around. Second, it is worth 
pointing out that knowledge is a highly dynamic variable, with positive mean growth, and 
relatively large differences across different country groups (Figure 5). Many countries, 
particularly in Asia, experience rapid knowledge growth, and much more so than the 
developed countries (despite the high initial level of knowledge of the latter. Hence, the 
distribution of knowledge across different parts of the globe is clearly changing, with a lot of 
catch-up going on. This tendency is not limited to the countries of South-East Asia and the 
Asian Tigers, although their performance  is  striking, but extends to countries in West Asia, 
North Africa and the new EU members as well. The least favourable performance  is recorded 
by the  former  members of the Soviet block and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
both fell behind in knowledge, indicating that these countries face severe problems in 
adapting to the requirements of the global knowledge based economy.   47









Note: For definition of the knowledge variable see Table 4. 
Source: See Appendix A1.   48
 
  Openness is a different matter. First of all there is hardly any correlation between 
openness and per capita income (Figure 6).  There are some  high income countries with high  
levels of openness, Hong Kong, Singapore, Belgium and Ireland  may be mentioned. But 
other high income countries, such as Japan and the United States, are much less open. This 
being said, there is clearly a strong tendency towards increasing openness in most countries 
(Figure 7), driven to a large extent by increasing foreign direct investments (FDI). This 
tendency is especially strong for the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the CIS, 
which were the least open at the beginning. 
 




Note: For definition of the openness variable see Table 4. 
Source: See Appendix A1. 
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Note: For definition of the openness variable see Table 4. 
Source: See Appendix A1. 
 
  The financial system variable, in contrast, is strongly correlated with income, although 
less so than knowledge (Figure 8). It is  also less dynamic than knowledge, in the sense that 
its mean change is close to zero (but positive). Traditionally,  the developed countries and, in 
particular, the Asian Tigers have excelled along this dimension, and this continues to some 
extent to be the case, though the capabilities of the Asian Tigers have increased less than 
those of other high income countries (Figure 9). It also interesting to note that there is very 
little catch-up going on along this dimension. In fact, with an exception for the new EU 
member countries, the  performance of other groups is inferior to that of the developed 
countries. The clearly worst performance is recorded by the African countries, which appear 
to fall behind the rest of the world in this dimension as well. 
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Note: For definition of the financial system variable see Table 4. 
Source: See Appendix A1.   51
 
  As with knowledge and finance, governance is closely correlated with  development 
(Figure 10). High income countries, including new EU members, tend to score much better 
than developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin-America. The main source of variation 
comes from a group of African countries, with much better governance than what should be 
expected, given their income levels. Hence, good governance is certainly not a sufficient 
condition  for prosperity (although it may be a necessary one).   In contrast to the three 
composite variables discussed so far, there is a general tendency towards decline in the 
quality of governance (Figure 11). This may be surprising, but it has to be remembered that in 
contrast to three composite variables already discussed, governance (and democracy) are 
measured through surveys. So what we are measuring is changes in perceptions, which, as 
previously pointed out,  may fluctuate for other reasons. Still it is interesting to note that the 
two most pronounced high-income groups, the developed countries and the Asian Tigers, 
have a more favourable development than all other country groups but North Africa. The 
clearly worst performers along this dimension are the former socialist countries in Eastern 
Europe and the CIS  joined by those from Central Asia. So in this case, too, very little catch-
up is going on. 
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Note: For definition of the governance variable see Table 4. 
Source: See Appendix A1.   53
  This is different for “democracy”. On average democratic standards and practices 
seem to be on the increase around the globe, and all country groupings appear to catch up 
relative to the developed countries, that used to be (and still is) in the lead in this area (Figures 
12 and 13). However, the relationship between democracy and development is weak at best. 
There are several countries with high levels of income that are not very democratic (with the 
Arab countries as the prime examples). Moreover,  the income levels of countries with high 
democratic “performance”  vary a lot (right part of the figure). Figure 14 illustrate this from a 
different angle, by plotting democracy (horizontal axis) against governance (vertical axis). As 
is evident from the graph the relationship between the two is  rather weak, confirming the 
findings of previous research on this issue (Glaeser et al. 2004). 
 




Note: For definition of the democracy variable see Table 4. 
Source: See Appendix A1. 
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Note: For definition of the governance and democracy variables see Table 4. 
Source: See Appendix A1. 
   55
  To sum up, there appears to be a very strong relationship between knowledge and 
development, and the same holds to some extent for the relationships between finance and 
development and governance and development. In contrast, openness and democracy are not 
strongly related to development, at least not as measured here. However, such simple 
correlations may mask more complex relationships, so in a second step we carry out a 
multivariate regression of the relationship between the five capabilities previously identified 
and GDP per capita. To test for the sensitivity of changing the definitions of the factors we 
use two different weighting schemes; first the most transparent one (in which only one link 
between an indicator and a factor was allowed) and second the broader version based on all 
significant correlations between indicators and factors (which led to broader but to some 
extent overlapping factor definitions). To test for the robustness of the results with respect to 
the composition of the sample we estimate the relationship with two different estimation 
techniques (OLS  and  a robust regression technique,  iteratively reweighted least squares
26).  
As is customary in  the literature we also report versions including, in addition to the 
capabilities  mentioned above, a battery of indicators reflecting geography, nature and history. 
Finally, since many of the variables included in the analysis were not significant following 
traditional statistical criteria,  we also undertook a stepwise backward-selection regression in 




Table 5 presents  the results from the regression analysis. Beta-coefficients are 
reported, hence the  role of a variable in the regression is reflected in the size of the estimated 
                                                 
26 Iteratively reweighted least squares is a robust regression technique, which assigns a weight to each 
observation, with lower weights given to outliers (rreg command in Stata 8.2.).   
27 The aim of the stepwise  procedure is to include only variables that contribute to the explanatory power of the 
model (above a chosen significance level). At each step the stepwise method also attempts to reintroduce already 
eliminated variables to control for a possibility that some of them might become significant later on. We 
specified the threshold for removal at 20% significance and the level for reintroducing a variable at 15%.     56
coefficient. The results are easily told. As before, Knowledge, Financial System and 
Governance, are positively associated with development (significant at a 1% level), while 
Openness and Democracy play no significant role. This finding is robust to changes in factor 
definitions, estimation techniques and inclusion of additional variables reflecting nature and 
history. Changes in factor definitions had more impact than differences in estimation 
technique, though, since it contributed to increasing the role of the Financial System variable 
at expense of the Governance variable (although both variables continued to be positively and 
significantly associated with growth). 
 
It should be pointed out, however, that while the  analysis presented above is a useful 
way to summarize the descriptive evidence, and test for the sensitivity of changing some of 
the underlying assumptions, it is not a test of causality. Arguably, there may be feedbacks 
from the level of development to some of the other capabilities.  To test for a possible 
endogeneity bias in the estimates, due to a  possible feedback from the level of development 
(the dependent variable) on capabilities, we conducted a Hausman (or Durbin–Wu–Hausman) 
test for endogeneity of the independent variables.
28 However, in the present case the test  
failed to provide evidence of endogeneity. 
 
                                                 
28 The test is performed by first regressing each potentially endogenous explanatory variable on all exogenous 
variables (and instruments), and then including residuals from these regressions in the original model. If some of 
the residuals come out as significant in the original model estimate, we accept endogeneity of the variable and 
the model should be estimated by, say, two-stages least squares regression in order to obtain consistent results. 
For further details see Wooldridge 2002, pp 118-122.    57
Table 5. Regression results - levels 
Construction method of the 







































































































































































































































Constant  .. 0.02  .. 0.01  ..  .. 0.01  .. 0.01  .. 
  .. (0.48)  .. (0.14)  ..  .. (0.28)  .. (0.14)  .. 
Knowledge  0.61*** 0.64*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.57*** 0.48*** 0.51*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.48***
  (12.11) (13.16) (8.75)  (8.28)  (11.46) (11.37) (11.74) (9.05)  (7.89)  (11.32) 
Openness  -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02  ..  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.02  .. 
   (0.91) (0.84) (0.21) (0.54)  ..  (0.14) (0.18) (0.55) (0.38)  .. 
Financial system  0.14*** 0.13** 0.13** 0.14** 0.16*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.40***
   (2.81) (2.58) (2.58) (2.48) (3.52) (6.80) (6.46) (6.72) (6.37) (8.07) 
Governance  0.30*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20***
   (5.50) (6.07) (4.84) (5.21) (5.05) (2.82) (3.37) (2.62) (3.00) (3.84) 
Democracy  -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03  ..  0.002 0.003  -0.01 -0.01  .. 
   (0.77) (0.78) (0.92) (0.77)  ..  (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16)  .. 
Longitude of country  .. ..  -0.05* -0.04  -0.06** ..  ..  -0.07*** -0.07* -0.08***
centroid  ..  ..  (1.68) (1.07) (2.00)  ..  ..  (2.62) (1.90) (3.10) 
Latitude of country centroid  .. ..  -0.04  -0.03  .. .. ..  -0.04  -0.04  -0.05* 
   .. ..  (1.16)  (0.64)  .. .. ..  (1.54)  (0.98)  (1.66) 
Log of land area  .. ..  0.04  0.03  .. .. ..  0.02  0.02  .. 
   .. ..  (0.86)  (0.54)  .. .. ..  (0.60)  (0.33)  .. 
Log of mean elevation  ..  ..  -0.06 -0.06 -0.07** ..  ..  -0.06 -0.06 -0.07** 
   ..  ..  (1.41) (1.21) (2.09)  ..  ..  (1.52) (1.24) (2.40) 
Access to ocean or navigable  .. ..  0.05  0.05  .. .. ..  0.02  0.02  .. 
river  .. ..  (0.76)  (0.93)  .. .. ..  (0.31)  (0.36)  .. 
Malaria ecology  .. ..  0.02  0.01  .. .. ..  0.02  0.01  .. 
   .. ..  (0.45)  (0.20)  .. .. ..  (0.44)  (0.23)  .. 
Cultural fractionalization  .. ..  -0.04  -0.02  .. .. ..  -0.04  -0.04  .. 
   .. ..  (0.81)  (0.54)  .. .. ..  (0.90)  (0.89)  .. 
Religious fractionalization  .. ..  -0.001  -0.02  .. .. ..  -0.02  -0.03  .. 
   .. ..  (0.01)  (0.49)  .. .. ..  (0.48)  (0.84)  .. 
.. ..  0.08* 0.07  0.09** ..  ..  0.09** 0.09** 0.08**  Log of oil & gas deposits 
per capita  ..  ..  (1.79) (1.52) (2.59)  ..  ..  (2.19) (2.04) (2.34) 
F  138.92 157.97 60.96  56.21  123.45 152.52  158.01  63.79 62.43 111.64 
R
2  0.85  .. 0.87  .. 0.86  0.86  .. 0.88  ..  0.88 
Observations  135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 
 
Note: Depended variable is log of average level of GDP per capita over 2000-2002 (PPP, constant 1995 USD). Absolute value of 
robust t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. Standardized variables used in the 
estimates (beta values reported). 
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  Figure 15 illustrates the implications of the above exercise for the differences in 
development levels across country groups.  The crucial role of knowledge for development 
comes through rather strongly, with governance in the second place. There are some 
interesting differences across country groups, though. For instance, a high level of knowledge 
appears to be  an important ingredient behind the ability of the new EU members to raise their 
levels of income to the present  level. Similarly, for Sub-Saharan Africa the results point to 
lack of knowledge – not governance or finance – as the most important factor behind the 
current level of underdevelopment. For the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and 
the CIS, however, it is the other way around. According to the analysis presented here, the 
current low levels of GDP per capita in these countries is not primarily caused by little 
knowledge, but a failure to develop a sufficient amount of complementary assets (financial 
system, governance) to exploit the potential given by existing knowledge resources. 
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Note: For definition of the variables see Table 4. 
Source: See Appendix A1. 
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7. What are the (most) critical factors for catching up? A regression 
analysis 
 
In this section we move one step further in our search for what the critical factors 
behind catch-up are. We will use the same tool as many previous studies in this area, e.g. a 
model of the Cornwall-Barro type.  In this model economic growth (the dependent variable) is 
regressed on the scope for catching up in knowledge, measured by (the log of) GDP per capita 
of the country in question, and a number of other “conditioning factors”. The expectation is 
that the less developed the country, the greater this scope will be, so the estimated coefficient 
of the log of GDP per capita variable is expected to be negative (implying slower growth in 
frontier countries than in technological laggards). This expectation has previously been 
confirmed by virtually every available study on the subject and is found to hold here as well, 
as will be shown below. However, as has been shown in section 2, this result does not hold 
unconditionally. Thus, although the potential for catch up is there, it requires a lot effort by 
poorer economies to tap into it. Exactly what efforts are most worthwhile ? This is what we 
are going to explore in the following. 
 
First a note on variables and theories. We have, following the literature in this area,  
identified the following  prime candidates for explaining why countries succeed or fail in 
exploiting the catch up potential: 
-  knowledge 
-  openness to  foreign knowledge , 
-  the development of the financial system, 
-  quality of governance and 
-  degree of democracy.   61
 
Moreover, we have developed synthetic measures for levels and changes of each of 
these. But is it the (initial) level or the change in this level during the period of investigation 
that matter for growth? This is of course a question that may be examined empirically, and we 
will do so in the following, but it is also an issue that theory may throw some light on. Take 
for instance the knowledge based approach to economic growth as outlined previously in this 
paper. According to this approach development implies an increase of knowledge along 
several complementary dimensions. Hence, levels of economic development and levels of 
knowledge development should be expected to be closely correlated, as has indeed shown to 
be the case (see the previous section), and so should changes in these two factors. Thus, 
following this approach economic growth  (increasing economic development) should be 
positively correlated with a growing level of knowledge, but not necessarily with the initial 
level of this variable. In fact, since the latter may be seen as measuring the potential for catch 
up in knowledge (just as GDP per capita), the correlation with economic growth  may well be 
negative. However, other theoretical approaches may yield different predictions on this point. 
For instance, one version of the knowledge based approach – that associated with so-called 
“new growth theory” (Romer 1990, see Aghion and Howitt 1998 for an overview) – argues 
that due to increasing returns to investments in knowledge, countries with higher levels of 
knowledge development may grow faster than those with less knowledge indefinitely.  
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Table 6. Regression results - growth 
Construction method of the 






































































































































































































































Constant  .. -0.01 ..  0.00 ..  .. -0.01 .. -0.02 .. 
   .. (0.10)  .. (0.08)  ..  .. (0.21)  .. (0.26)  .. 
Log of the initial   -0.47** -0.40** -0.43** -0.41** -0.57*** -0.55*** -0.46*** -0.53** -0.51*** 0.70***
GDP per capita   (2.45) (2.37) (2.00) (2.22) (3.84) (2.76) (2.85) (2.37) (2.80) (4.60) 
Knowledge  0.01  0.00 -0.26 -0.18  ..  0.03  0.03 -0.15 -0.06  .. 
  (0.05) (0.00) (1.13) (0.92)  ..  (0.18) (0.21) (0.81) (0.34)  .. 
Openness  0.00 -0.05  0.03 -0.09  ..  0.05 -0.05  0.08 -0.09  .. 
   (0.00) (0.70) (0.29) (0.95)  ..  (0.52) (0.45) (0.57) (0.76)  .. 
Financial system  0.41*** 0.27** 0.33* 0.19  0.37*** 0.72*** 0.56*** 0.64*** 0.48*** 0.72***
   (2.92) (2.58) (2.33) (1.64) (2.68) (3.99) (4.51) (3.32) (3.30) (4.58) 
Governance  0.39*** 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.10 0.24* 0.18  0.36** 0.28** 
   (3.30) (3.34) (3.30) (3.51) (3.69) (0.65) (1.67) (1.07) (2.26) (2.20) 
Democracy  0.13 0.14 0.19 0.20*  0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09  .. 
   (1.16) (1.58) (1.50) (1.80) (1.53) (0.96) (0.86) (0.65) (0.71)  .. 
∆ knowledge  0.30*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.22** 0.22*** 0.21** 0.20** 0.22***
  (3.54) (4.05) (3.18) (3.28) (4.07) (2.42) (2.98) (2.04) (2.33) (2.76) 
∆ openness  0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 
   (1.18) (1.48) (1.41) (1.36) (1.47) (1.11) (1.56) (1.42) (1.52) (1.60) 
∆ financial system  0.25*** 0.26*** 0.21** 0.22** 0.24*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.34***
   (2.69) (3.11) (2.21) (2.48) (2.62) (4.03) (5.14) (3.37) (4.09) (4.31) 
∆ governance  0.02 0.10 0.07 0.11  ..  -0.08 0.06  -0.03 0.07  .. 
   (0.20) (1.39) (0.65) (1.44)  ..  (0.62) (0.68) (0.23) (0.79)  .. 
∆ democracy  0.05 0.12 0.05 0.14* ..  0.15 0.18* 0.11  0.20** .. 
   (0.47) (1.46) (0.43) (1.66)  ..  (1.22) (2.04) (0.88) (2.02)  .. 
Longitude of country  .. ..  0.11  0.11  0.10  .. ..  0.08  0.06  .. 
centroid  ..  ..  (1.55) (1.47) (1.48)  ..  ..  (1.09) (0.81)  .. 
Latitude of country centroid  .. ..  0.10  0.03  .. .. ..  0.08  0.00  .. 
   .. ..  (1.25)  (0.34)  .. .. ..  (1.01)  (0.02)  .. 
Log of land area  .. ..  0.01  -0.02  .. .. ..  0.02  -0.01  .. 
   .. ..  (0.10)  (0.18)  .. .. ..  (0.15)  (0.13)  .. 
Log of mean elevation  .. ..  0.10  0.02  .. .. ..  0.08  0.01  .. 
   .. ..  (0.93)  (0.24)  .. .. ..  (0.82)  (0.09)  .. 
Access to ocean or navigable  .. ..  0.04  0.11  .. .. ..  0.06  0.12  .. 
river  .. ..  (0.28)  (0.89)  .. .. ..  (0.48)  (1.05)  .. 
Malaria ecology  .. ..  -0.07  -0.09  .. .. ..  -0.03  -0.06  .. 
   .. ..  (0.66)  (0.81)  .. .. ..  (0.26)  (0.53)  .. 
Cultural fractionalization  .. ..  -0.17* -0.07  -0.16* ..  ..  -0.17*  -0.06  -0.17** 
   ..  ..  (1.73) (0.80) (1.92)  ..  ..  (1.68) (0.69) (2.04) 
Religious fractionalization  .. ..  0.06  0.04  .. .. ..  0.03  0.00  .. 
   .. ..  (0.74)  (0.51)  .. .. ..  (0.30)  (0.01)  .. 
..  ..  0.12 0.06 0.11  ..  ..  0.11 0.08 0.11  Log of oil & gas deposits 
per capita  ..  ..  (1.32) (0.65) (1.40)  ..  ..  (1.19) (0.86) (1.39) 
F  9.11 6.65 4.84 3.95 9.64 9.08 7.80 4.66 4.49 9.61 
R
2  0.36  .. 0.41  .. 0.39  0.36  .. 0.40  .. 0.38 
Observations  135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 
 
Note: Depended variable is annual growth of GDP per capita over 1992-2002 (PPP, constant 1995 USD). Absolute value of 
robust t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. Standardized variables used in the 
estimates (beta values reported). 
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Table 6 presents  the results from the regression analysis. As before we report 
estimates using two different estimation techniques (OLS and iteratively reweighted least 
squares
 ), two different ways to define the composite indicators (one factor per variable and 
significant loadings ) and with (and without) a battery of other indicators reflecting exogenous 
factors related to geography, nature and history. Since, as in the preceding section, many of 
these variables failed to be significant following traditional statistical criteria,  we also report 
results for a “best model” in which these insignificant variables were gradually eliminated  
using a stepwise backward-selection  method.
29  To test for a possible endogeneity bias in the 
estimates, due to a  possible feedback from economic growth (the dependent variable) on 
capability changes, we applied the Hausman (or Durbin–Wu–Hausman) test for endogeneity 
referred to in the previous section. The test failed to confirm the existence of such 
endogeneity problems.   
 
Since the results are very similar across the different specifications, we will 
summarize them as follows.
30 First, the (log of the) level of GDP per capita has a significant 
and negative impact on growth, indicating there is a potential for catch up by poorer countries 
(as suggested by the knowledge based approach). However, the ability to tap into this 
potential depends on other conditioning factors; growth of knowledge, good governance and a 
well functioning financial system. For the remaining composite factors the evidence is more 
mixed. On balance one is tempted to conclude that neither openness nor (degree of) 
democracy (or changes in these factors over time) appear to be very important for growth. 
Furthermore, the initial level of knowledge tends to be negatively correlated with growth 
(consistent with the knowledge based approach), although the relationship is generally not 
significant. Hence there is very little support for the idea backed by “new growth theory” that 
                                                 
29  The log of the initial GDP per capita was always included (to test for “conditional convergence”) . 
30 We place most emphasis on the results with one factor per variable, since the alternative method, significant 
loadings, leads to partly overlapping factors (and hence problems of interpretation).   64
high levels of knowledge tend to perpetuate growth indefinitely, leading to divergence in 
income and productivity across the globe. 
 
To illustrate the consequences of the estimated model, we include in Table 7 a 
calculation of the contribution of the variables in the core model to the growth of GDP per 
capita of various country groupings. As is evident from the table the model gets the 
qualitative features right. Potentially, because of a larger scope for imitation,  low-income 
countries should be expected to grow more than two percentage points faster than the  rich 
ones, assuming that other factors are the same. But other factors are not the same.  In reality, 
the higher potential for diffusion that developing countries face is more than counteracted by  
a better financial system, better governance and faster growth of knowledge in the rich 
countries, so that in the end the difference in GDP per capita between rich and poor countries 
is widening instead of narrowing.  
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Developed  Countries 22 19,661 2.2  2.3 1.4  -1.9 0.9 1.3 0.4  -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Asian  Tigers  4 15,536 3.3  3.3 1.4  -1.6 1.4 1.3 0.1 0.6  -0.1  -0.1 0.3 
New  EU  Members  8  8,002 3.6  2.6 1.4  -0.8 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 
West  Asia  10  7,990 0.9  1.5 1.4 -0.4  0.4  0.1 -0.4  0.4 -0.4  0.1  0.3 
Latin  America  21  4,795 0.8  0.8 1.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3  0.2  0.1 -0.1  0.1 -0.2 
East Europe & CIS  17  3,584 0.1  0.3  1.4  0.3  -0.9  -0.4  -0.1  -0.6  0.4  0.1  0.1 
North  Africa  5  3,313 1.4  1.9 1.4 0.3 0.5  -0.1  -0.3 0.6  -0.2  -0.4 0.2 
South-East  Asia  9  2,802 3.3  2.9 1.4 0.6 0.3  -0.5  -0.1 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.4 
Sub-Sahara  Africa  33  1,935 0.5  0.5 1.4  1.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 
Central  Asia  6  1,531 2.3  2.2 1.4 1.2 0.2  -0.6 0.1  -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
High  income  33 17,005 1.9  2.1 1.4  -1.6 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Medium  income  50  5,066 1.6  1.2 1.4  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Low  income  52  1,938 0.8  1.1 1.4  1.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1  0.0  0.0 -0.2 -0.2 
 
Note: Based on results of the stepwise backward selection regression (one factor per variable). GDP per capita is in PPP (constant USD) and annual growth rates. 
The income groups are defined by the initial income level as follows: high-income more than 10,000; medium income between 2,500 and 10,000; low income 
below 2,500.  
Source: Own computations. 
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Three country groups that actually reduced the gap vis-à-vis with the developed world 
during this period (the “winners”) were the Asian Tigers, South-East Asia and the new EU 
members, while  three that  clearly fell behind (the “losers”) were the Latin American ones, 
the former socialist countries (CIS/Eastern Europe) and the countries from Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In Figure 16 we illustrate the reasons behind this difference in performance. Although 
the initial gap indicates a greater potential for the “losers”, which are poorer on average, this 
was more than counteracted by the other factors taken into account by the model. Three 
factors stand out; a better (and improving) financial system, better governance and a growing 
knowledge gap. History and nature also contribute somewhat as do “other factors” (not 
included in the model, e.g, the predictive error). 
 
Figure 16: Contribution to catching up in winner vs. looser regions 
 
 
Note: Differences between contribution to growth in the winning (Asian Tigers, Sough-East Asia and the new 
EU members) and losing regions (Latin America, Eastern Europe and the CIS and Sub-Sahara Africa). Averages 
over individual countries based on results of the stepwise backward selection regression (one factor per 
variable). 
Source: See Appendix A1. 
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Finally we conducted a sensitivity test of excluding from the sample countries with a 
high share of estimated data and frequent occurrence of military conflicts (see Appendix A3). 
This reduced the sample to 110 countries. Among the countries that were excluded in this way 
were many of the former socialist CIS member countries,  Asian countries with a 
socialist/communist background, such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, some Middle-East 
countries such as Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates and a several countries 
severely plundered by wars (mostly in Africa).
31 The results confirmed the importance of 
growing knowledge and good governance for growth. However, in some specifications, the 
financial system (and its improvement) failed to be significant, while democracy (and its 
improvement) was. Hence, it is possible that the finding that democracy is not significantly 
correlated with development depends on the inclusion of the above countries, some of which, 
although not very “democratic”, have arguably been successful in catch up recently. 
                                                 
31 All of the excluded countries are marked with stars in Appendix A2.   68
 
8. Concluding remarks 
  
The point of departure of this paper has been the finding that income gaps in the global 
economy are widening rather than narrowing. In fact, historical research shows that this is a 
long run trend. However, there have always been examples of countries that have defied the 
trend and managed to catch up with the much richer countries at the technology frontier, and 
this also holds for the period under investigation here. The reasons for this have been a matter 
of considerable controversy, though.  
 
However, in recent years the quality and availability of data on different aspects of 
development have improved a lot, and this might give researchers in this area an opportunity 
for investigating the reasons behind the large differences in economic performance in more 
depth. Attempting to exploit this opportunity this paper starts with an overview of the 
different approaches in the literature to the explanation of these differences and in particular 
the empirical indicators and methods that these different approaches have highlighted. This 
led to the formulation of a synthetic empirical model and, with the help of factor analysis, the 
identification of  set of “capabilities” which, according to the literature, might be assumed to 
be of critical importance for catch up. 
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The following “capabilities” were identified  and measured with the help of data for 
twenty-nine different variables for 135 countries over the 1990s: 
-   knowledge 
-  openness to technology/knowledge from abroad, 
-  the development of the financial system, 
-  quality of governance and 
-  degree of democracy. 
 
The first of these, knowledge, is a synthetic measure of some of the most critically 
important capabilities required in the global knowledge based economy. It includes among 
other things a skilled labour force, as reflected in educational standards/investments, R&D 
resources and a well-developed ICT infrastructure. The analysis conducted here suggests that 
knowledge capability is a must for countries that wish to succeed in catch up. There is a 
strong, significant and robust statistical relationship between (level and change of) GDP per 
capita on the one hand, and (level and change of) knowledge on the other. Historical and 
descriptive evidence also suggest that countries that have succeeded in catch up have given a 
high priority to the knowledge dimension of development. Note, however, the global 
knowledge based economy is a moving target. To defend a high place in the development 
hierarchy it is not sufficient to rest on past achievements. A country that wishes to retain its 
competitive position or, more ambitiously, catch up, needs to continuously invest in the 
generation of knowledge capabilities. 
 
Albeit knowledge emerges from the analysis as a clear priority no. 1 for development, 
it is not sufficient. Well-developed knowledge capabilities need to be backed by a well-
working financial system and good governance. Hence, one of the challenges in development   70
is to be able to coordinate these different aspects of development in an efficient way. 
Sometimes it is asserted that this is mainly a question of successfully “westernising” the 
political system, e.g., adapting to institutional arrangements that have proved to be successful 
in the United States and other western democracies.  This study finds little support for such 
assertions. Especially for poorer countries there seems to be little evidence suggesting that 
adherence to western democratic institutions matter for growth. Hence, there is no 
institutional “quick fix” to the problem of development. What is required, it seems, is the 
ability to continuously improve knowledge capabilities, through the mobilization of human, 
financial and administrative resources, and this appears to have been possible in systems with 
quite different institutional arrangements. This conclusion does not only rest on statistical 
evidence but is also supported by historical research (consider for instance the recent 
performance of countries such as China and Vietnam, the Asian Tigers before the 1990s or 
pre-world-war-two Japan). However, what holds for relatively poor countries that wish to 
catch up does not necessarily extend to countries further up the development ladder, and it is 
possible that the importance of differences in institutional arrangements increases with the 
level of development. It is also possible that there is a feedback from development on 
institutions, as suggested by Glaeser et al. (2004). These are clearly questions in need of 
further research. 
 
Another result from the study, confirming previous research by Rodrik et al. (2004), is 
that there is virtually no support for the argument that differences in “openness” matter for 
growth. This holds regardless of whether a more “traditional” measure of openness, focusing 
on trade and FDI, was used or if this was substituted by a broader measure reflecting a 
number of other possible aspects of the “openness” concept. This finding clearly runs counter 
to arguments based on “new growth theories” emphasizing the openness dimension as   71
perhaps the single most important one for development. Note, however, that the results 
reached here does not necessarily invalidate the argument, central to these theories, that flows 
of ideas across boarders are important for global growth. What the results imply, perhaps, is 
either that trade and FDI may not be the most efficient channels for such flows or that what 
matters for performance is not so much differential access to such flows as the ability to take 
advantage of them (knowledge capability). Again this is an issue that may require further 
research. 
 
It is appropriate at this point to acknowledge the limitations of the analysis. What has 
been attempted, and also achieved, is to take a sweeping view of differences in development 
and capabilities across a large sample of different types of countries. To be able to measure 
the role of capabilities in development we need good indicators with broad coverage. 
Although the supply of indicators has improved in recent years, perhaps as a result of an 
increasing concern for the importance of many “non-economic” factors (e.g., factors 
traditionally not taken into account by economists), there is still relatively limited coverage, 
except perhaps for the last few years, and this sharply constrains the analysis. However, with 
time the quality and coverage of relevant indicators should be expected to increase, and this 
will provide new opportunities for making more precise assessment on what the critical 
capabilities for catch up are.
32 
                                                 
32 In this paper, an attempt was made to fill some of the most obvious “holes” in the data set through estimation, 
but it does of course introduce an element of uncertainty with respect to what the “true” statistics is. Precisely for 
this reason we have in this paper chosen to focus more on the understanding of global dynamics than on 
developments for specific countries on specific indicators. We have also attempted to supplement the statistical 
analysis with qualitative insights derived from historical analyses.     72
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Appendix A1 (data & sources) 
A brief overview of definitions, sources and time/country coverage of the indicators is given in 
the table below. The main source of data is the World Bank (World Development Indicators 2004), 
which combines various sources of data for a large sample of countries. The database has been 
complemented by data from other organizations such as UNCTAD (FDI Database), OECD (MSTI and 
Patent Databases), International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Heritage Foundation, Frazer 
Institute and others, and in addition datasets produced by research projects or scholars. National 
sources were only used for Taiwan if necessary and  in a few cases for R&D data from developing 
countries. 
 
We originally collected data for all independent states (app. 175 countries) and a large pool of 
indicators (app. 100 indicators). The screening revealed that a group of (mostly least developed) 
countries suffers from a lot of missing data. Similarly data for a large number of relevant indicators are 
available only for a group of high (medium) income countries and/or only for the most recent period 
(from the second half of the nineties). A closer look, furthermore, revealed that some indicators suffer 
from high volatility (primarily in developing world), methodological changes over the period or are 
merely variations of each other. These indicators were then skipped. In order to strike a balance 
between the need to bring rich evidence for as many countries as possible and data availability and 
methodological coherence, we selected 135 countries (see Appendix A3 for the full list of countries) 
and twenty-nine indicators on social capabilities (plus ten „fixed factors“). We use the indicators in the 
form of three-year averages (1992-1994 and 2000-2002) to limit influence of shocks and measurement 
errors occurring in specific years.  
 
Although the selected indicators have broad coverage, in some cases there were missing values 
that had to be dealt with. A few missing observations among the fixed factors (geography, etc.) have 
been filled in from other sources or estimated on the basis of regional averages. Full coverage of the 
indicators for social capabilities, however, is available for only one third of the countries and six 
indicators. We use the impute procedure in Stata 8.2. to fill in the missing values (see the Stata 8.2. 
Manual for details). In each case we based the estimation on data for other indicators in the dataset.  
 
In many cases only a few observations had to be estimated. But in some cases larger amount of 
data had to be estimated to keep the country or indicator in the analysis. The proportion of countries 
estimated for each indicator is given in the last column of the following table. Missing values were 
most frequent for stocks of human capital, market capitalization of listed companies and some of the 
governance indicators. R&D were not available for most of the low income countries. We assumed 
that a country with zero patents jointly with zero scientific articles has also zero R&D expenditures, 
which was the case for app. 40 of the least developed countries. The remaining missing R&D figures 
were estimated using the procedure described above. Countries with a lot of missing data (between 
15% and 30%) include Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Lebanon, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, 
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Armenia, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Mauritania, United Arab Emirates, Belarus, Ethiopia and Vietnam (these countries are marked with 
stars in Appendix 2). The proportion of missing data is rather continuous within our sample of 135 
countries, so that we decided to skip only the most obvious „worst“ cases to keep a broad sample. 
Using more conservative criteria would inevitably shrink coverage to a group of medium/high income 
countries, which is not the main focus of the paper.  
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It should be stressed that considerable care was taken to check the estimated data against 
observed figures in countries with similar characteristics (level of development, region, history, etc.). 
In some cases the estimated data would exceed the maximum observed value of an indicator 
elsewhere. In such cases we truncated the data by replacing the estimated values by the maximum 
observed figure.  
 
Finally some indicators deserved special care due to their nature or methodology. It is customary, 
for instance, to suppress the “home country advantage” of United States in the USPTO patent counts 
indicator, since the propensity of American residents to register inventions in their own national patent 
office is higher than that of non-residents.  We adjusted this home base bias downwards based on a 
comparison between the Japanese and the United States patents registered at the European Patent 
Office (EPO), which represents a foreign institution both for American and Japanese inventors.  We 
used an estimation method proposed by Archibugi and Coco (2004, p. 633): 
Adjusted US patents at the USPTO = (JAPUSA * USAEPO)/ JAPEPO 
where JAPUSA represents patents granted to Japanese residents in the United States, while 
USAEPO and JAPEPO capture patents granted to Japanese and American residents at the EPO.  
 
We also reversed the scale, while keeping the original range, for some of the governance 
indicators in order to have the indicator in increasing order (with low value signalling weak 
governance and vice versa). Note that this change of scale does not alter any property of the data but 
simplifies the interpretation of loadings in the factor analysis. 
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD): 
GERD is total (public and private) intramural expenditure on research and experimental 
development (R&D) performed on the national territory. R&D comprise creative work 
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge and the use of 
this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.  
% of GDP 
World Bank  (World Development 
Indicators), OECD (MSTI 




Number of patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). A patent is 
assigned to a country according to the inventor’s country of residence. When a patent was 
invented by several inventors from different countries, the respective contributions of each 
country is taken into account. 
per capita  OECD Patent Database (based on 
the USPTO)  Full .. 
Science & engineering articles: 
Scientific and technical journal articles refer to the number of scientific and engineering 
articles published in the following fields: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical 
medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth and space sciences. The 
articles are from a set of journals classified and covered by the Institute for Scientific 
Information’s Science Citation and Social Sciences Citation Indexes. Article counts are based 
on fractional assignments, so as the patent counts. 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators) and the U.S. National 
Science Foundation (based on 
Institute for Scientific Information - 
Science Citation Index and Social 
Sciences Citation Index) 
Full 1 
Personal computers: 
Personal computers are self-contained computers designed to be used by a single individual. 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development 




Internet users:  
Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network. 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development 




Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers:  
Fixed lines are telephone mainlines connecting a customer's equipment to the public switched 
telephone network (PSTN). Mobile phone subscribers refer to users of portable telephones 
subscribing to an automatic public mobile telephone service using cellular technology that 
provides access to the PSTN. Subscription refers to the recurring fixed charge for subscribing 
to the PSTN. 
per capita 
World Bank (World Development 




ISO 9000 certifications:  
ISO 9000 is a family of standards approved by the International Standards Organization (ISO) 
that define a quality management and quality assurance program. The ISO 9000 certification 
confirms that the enterprise follows procedures for ensuring quality defined by a collection of 
formal international standards, technical specifications and handbooks. 
per capita  International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO)  Full ..   79
Tertiary school enrolment:  
Gross enrolment is the ratio of the number of tertiary students of all ages (gross) expressed as a 
percentage of the tertiary school-age population. Tertiary education, whether or not to an 
advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the 
successful completion of education at the secondary level. 
% gross 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators), UNESCO and USAID 
(Global Education Database) 
Full 1 
Teacher-pupil ratio in primary education: 
Primary school pupil-teacher ratio is the number of primary school teachers (regardless of their 
teaching assignment) divided by the number of pupils enrolled in primary school. 
ratio 
World Bank (World Development 
Indicators), UNESCO and USAID 
(Global Education Database) 
Full 5 
Life expectancy at birth: 
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if 
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
years  World Bank (World Development 
Indicators)  Full 1 
Average schooling years in population: 
The variable is constructed using each country’s typical duration of years of schooling at 
each level, which is combined into a aggregate measure. 
years  Barro and Lee (2000)  1990 and 2000  33 
Higher school complete in population: 
Percentage of population who have successfully completed tertiary level of schooling. Each 
cycle of education has significant variation in duration across countries. The variable accounts 
of this variation by using information on the typical duration of tertiary level of schooling 
within countries. 
%  Barro and Lee (2000)  1990 and 2000  33 
Merchandise imports:  
Merchandise imports show the c.i.f. value of goods received from the rest of the world. Goods 
simply being transported through a country (good in transit) or temporarily admitted (except 
for goods for inward processing) are not included in the international merchandise trade 
statistics. 
% of GDP  World Bank (World Development 
Indicators)  Full .. 
FDI inward stock:  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship 
and reflecting a lasting interest in and control by a resident entity in one economy (parent 
enterprise) of an enterprise resident in a different economy (affiliate enterprise). FDI stock is 
the value of the share of capital and reserves (including retained profits) in the affiliate 
enterprise attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the 
parent enterprises. Inward direction denotes a non-resident direct investment in the reporting 
economy. 
% of GDP  UNCTAD (FDI Database)  Full  .. 
Interest rate spread: 
Interest rate spread is the interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus the 
interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. 
%  World Bank (World Development 
Indicators)  Full 17 
Market capitalization of listed companies:  
Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of 
shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies 
listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
% of GDP  World Bank (World Development 
Indicators)  Full 29   80
Domestic credit to private sector:  
Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector, 
such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts 
receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit 
to public enterprises. 
% of GDP  World Bank (World Development 
Indicators)  Full 2 
Physical integrity human rights: 
The variable is average score on a group of four rights known as the “physical integrity rights 
“: rights to freedom from extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture, and political 
imprisonment. Extrajudicial killings are killings by government officials without due process 
of law. Disappearances are cases in which people have disappeared, political motivation 
appears likely, and the victims have not been found. Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting 
of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals 
at the instigation of government officials. Political imprisonment refers to the incarceration of 
people (including placing them under “house arrest”) by government officials due to political 
reasons. 
index 
(0 to 2) 
Cingranelli and Richards (2004); 
based on the Amnesty International 
and the US State Department Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices 
Full 1 
Impartial courts: 
The variable refers to the fact whether a trusted legal framework exists for private businesses 
to challenge the legality of government actions or regulation.  
index 
(0 to 10) 
Gwartney and Lawson (2004) – the 
Frazer Institute (based on the WEF 
Global Competitiveness Report; 






Law and order: 
Rule of law and order is the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the 
established institutions, to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. High score 
indicates sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provision for an orderly 
succession of power. Low score reflects tradition of depending on physical force or illegal 
means to settle claims. 
index 
(0 to 10) 
Gwartney and Lawson (2004) – the 
Frazer Institute (based on Political 
Risk Component of the International 







The factor scores the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the 
degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also accounts for the possibility that 
private property will be expropriated. The scale of the indicator has been reversed into 
increasing order, while keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 5) 
Heritage Foundation - Index of 
Economic Freedom (based primarily 
on the Economist Intelligence Unit, 







The factor measures how easy or difficult it is to open and operate a business. The scale of the 
indicator has been reversed into increasing order, while keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 5) 
Heritage Foundation - Index of 
Economic Freedom (based primarily 
on the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
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Informal Market: 
The factor relies on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which 
measures the perceptions of well-informed people with regard to the extent of corruption, 
defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit. The extent of corruption reflects the 
frequency of corrupt payments, the value of bribes paid and the resulting obstacle imposed on 
businesses. For countries that are not covered in the CPI, the informal market score is 
estimated using information on the extent of smuggling, piracy of intellectual property, 
informal labour, etc. The scale of the indicator has been reversed into increasing order, while 
keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 5) 
Heritage Foundation- Index of 
Economic Freedom (based primarily 
on the Transparency International, 





Index of democracy and autocracy: 
Institutionalized autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. 
Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, 
and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Institutionalized 
democracy is defined as one in which political participation is fully, competitive, executive 
recruitment is elective, and constraints on the chief executive are substantial. The variables 
ranges from autocracy to democracy in increasing order (Revised Combined Polity Score - 
POLITY2 variable) 
index 
(-10 to 10) 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002) - Polity 
IV Dataset  Full 1 
Political constraint: 
The variable estimate the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may 
lead to a change in government policy. It identifies the number of independent branches of 
government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) with veto power over policy 
change. The measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across 
branches of government and to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each 
legislative branch (POLCONIII variable) 
index 
(0 to 1) 
Henisz (2002)  up to 2001  .. 
Legislative index of political competitiveness (LIEC): 
The variable reflects competitiveness of elections into legislative branches. Knowing the 
formal, constitutional rules governing countries is one way to characterize democracy; an 
important supplement is to know whether these rules are applied in practice. The Indices of 
Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC & EIEC) address both of these issues. The highest score of 
the LIEC index goes to countries elections in which multiple parties compete in elections and 
the largest party receives less than 75% of the vote. The lowest score goes to countries without 
or with unelected legislature. The score is supplemented by information on voting 
irregularities, whether candidate intimidation was serious enough to affect electoral outcomes, 
whether important parties boycott elections or the election results. etc. 
index 
(1 to 7) 
Beck, et. al (2001) – Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI)  up to 2000  1 
Executive index of political competitiveness (EIEC): 
The variable reflects competitiveness for post in executive branches in government. Besides 
the common features with the LIEC (see above), the EIEC takes into account a balance of 
power between legislature & executive, e.g. the method of the electoral college appointing, 
whether military has significant influence, whether the political system is presidential vs. 
parliamentary, etc. 
index 
(1 to 7) 
Beck, et. al (2001) – Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI)  up to 2000  1   82
Political rights: 
Freedom is the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the 
government and other centres of potential domination. Political rights enable people to 
participate freely in the political process, including through the right to vote, compete for 
public office, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are 
accountable to the electorate. Political rights can be affected by state actions, as well as by 
non-state actors, including terrorists and other armed groups. The standards are derived 
primarily from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The scale of the indicator has been 
reversed into increasing order, while keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 7) 
Freedom House – Index of Freedom 
in the World   Full 1 
Civil liberties: 
Freedom is the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the 
government and other centres of potential domination. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state. Civil liberties can be affected by state actions, 
as well as by non-state actors, including terrorists and other armed groups. The standards are 
derived primarily from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The scale of the indicator 
has been reversed into increasing order, while keeping its original range. 
index 
(1 to 7) 
Freedom House - Index of Freedom 
in the World  Full 1 
Longitude of country centroid: 
Longitude is measured from the Prime Meridian with positive values going east and negative 
values going west. 
degrees 
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) - 
CID Geography Datasets (missing 
data filled from Easterly and Sewadeh 
2002) 
.. 
Latitude of country centroid: 
Latitude is measured from the equator, with positive values going north and negative values 
going south. 
degrees 
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) - 
CID Geography Datasets (missing 
data filled from Easterly and Sewadeh 
2002) 
.. 
Log of land area: 
Country’s total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental 
shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water bodies 
includes major rivers and lakes. 
log of km
2  World Bank (World Development 
Indicators)  .. 
Log of mean elevation (above sea level)  log of meters Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) - 
CID Geography Datasets  3 
Access to ocean-navigable river: 
The proportion of the population in 1994 within 100 km. of the ocean or ocean-navigable 
river, excluding coastline above the winter extent of sea ice and the rivers that flow to this 
coastline. 
%  Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) - 
CID Geography Datasets  3 
Malaria ecology: 
Ecologically-based spatial index of the stability of malaria transmission based on the 
interaction of climate with the dominant properties of anapheline vectors of malaria that 
determine vectorial capacity. 
index 
(0 to 100) 
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Cultural fractionalization: 
Fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given 
country will not belong to the same cultural group. The variable combines measures of ethnic 
and language fractionalization into a single indicator of cultural fractionalization. The ethic 
diversity is complemented by distance in languages tree diagrams between the ethic groups. If 
ethic groups in a country speak structurally unrelated languages, the cultural fractionalization 
will be the same as the ethic fractionalization. The more similar are the languages, the more 
will the cultural measure be reduced below the ethic fractualization index. 
index 
(0 to 1) 
Fearon (2003)  1 
Religious fractionalization: 
Fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given 
country will not belong to the same religious group. 
index 
(0 to 1) 
Fearon and Laitin (2003), missing 
data filled from Alesina, et. al (2003)  .. 
Log of oil & gas deposits per capita: 
Oil & gas (hydrocarbon) deposits are the log of total BTUs (Basic Transmission Unit – a unit 
of energy equal to the work done by a power of 1000 watts operating for one hour) per person 
of proven crude oil and natural gas reserves in 1993. 
logs 
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) - 
CID Geography Datasets (missing 
data filled from the CIA Fact Book) 
3 
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Appendix A2 (composites of social capabilities) 
Knowledge Openness  Financial 







































































































Australia  1.8 1.7  -0.3  -0.1 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.1 
Austria  1.4 1.7  -0.2 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 
Belgium  1.5 1.8 0.9 1.5 0.4 0.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 
Canada  1.7 1.7 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.1 
Denmark  1.7 1.9  -0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.1 
Finland  1.5 1.9  -0.5 0.2 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.1 
France  1.3 1.5  -0.4 0.1 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 
Germany  1.3 1.7  -0.5 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.1 
Greece 1.1  1.6  -0.3  -0.1  0.0 0.7 0.8 0.5 1.0 1.0 
Ireland  1.1 1.5 0.9 1.3 0.1 0.6 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.1 
Israel  1.4 1.9 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 
Italy  1.3 1.6  -0.8  -0.3 0.0 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 
Japan  1.4 1.7  -2.3  -1.7 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Netherlands  1.4 1.7 0.5 1.1 0.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.1 
New  Zealand  1.5 1.7 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.0 1.1 
Norway  1.5 1.8  -0.3  -0.2 0.8 1.0 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.1 
Portugal  0.8 1.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 
Spain  1.0 1.5  -0.4 0.2 0.7 1.3 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.1 
Sweden  1.8 2.1  -0.3 0.4 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.1 
Switzerland  1.6 1.8 0.0 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.0 
United  Kingdom  1.4 1.6  -0.1 0.1 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.0 1.0 
United  States  1.8 2.0  -1.1  -0.7 2.0 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.1 
Asian Tigers 
Hong  Kong*  0.9 1.3 2.1 2.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.7  -0.1 0.3 
Korea  1.0 1.5  -0.6  -0.1 1.6 1.3 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Singapore  0.8 1.5 2.0 2.1 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.6  -0.1  -0.2 
Taiwan  0.9 1.5  -0.1 0.3 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.0  -0.5 0.8 
 
New EU Members 
Czech  Republic  0.9 1.2 0.3 1.1 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.3 1.0 
Estonia  0.8 1.5 0.2 1.5  -0.5 0.4 1.1 1.1  -0.1 1.0 
Hungary  1.1 1.5 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.6 1.2 0.8 0.3 1.1 
Latvia  0.8 1.3  -0.1 0.7  -0.8 0.1 0.5 0.5  -0.2 1.0 
Lithuania  0.8 1.3 0.0 0.7  -0.4  -0.2 0.7 0.3  -0.1 1.1 
Poland  0.9 1.4  -0.6 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1 1.0 
Slovakia  0.7 1.1 0.1 1.0 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.3 0.2 1.0 
Slovenia  1.1 1.7 0.4 0.6  -0.6 0.4 1.2 1.0 0.3 1.1   85
 
West Asia 
Iran  -0.3  0.4 -0.4 -1.0  0.0  0.0 -1.1 -2.0 -1.3 -0.3 
Jordan  0.4 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.4  -1.2  -0.8 
Kuwait  0.8 1.1  -0.8  -0.8 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.1  -1.9  -1.1 
Lebanon*  0.5 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.2  -0.1  -0.4  -0.5  -0.2 
Oman  -0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.9  -2.7  -2.0 
Saudi  Arabia*  0.4 0.9  -0.1  -0.4  -0.1 1.3 0.5 0.4  -3.5  -3.2 
Syria  -0.1  0.2  0.0 -0.3  0.2  0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -2.0 -1.8 
Turkey  0.0  0.6 -0.6  0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2  0.6  0.7 
United  Arab  Emirates*  0.4 0.7 0.2  -0.1 0.5 0.1 1.1 1.2  -2.0  -2.2 
Yemen  -1.3 -0.7  0.9 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -1.1 -1.0 -0.4 
Latin America 
Argentina  0.8 1.1  -1.3  -0.8 0.1  -0.1 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.9 
Bolivia  -0.1  0.3 -0.1  0.3 -0.4  0.1 -0.1 -0.5  0.8  1.0 
Brazil  0.1  0.5 -1.4 -0.7 -0.1 -0.7  0.0 -0.3  0.6  0.7 
Colombia  0.0  0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -1.2 -1.2  0.8  0.7 
Costa  Rica  0.5 0.8 0.3 0.7  -0.4  -0.1 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 
Dominican  Republic -0.5 -0.1  0.4  0.7 -0.4  0.0 -0.1 -0.2  0.8  0.9 
Ecuador  0.1  0.4 -0.2  0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8  0.7  0.9 
El  Salvador  -0.2 0.2  -0.3 0.4  -1.3  -1.0 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.9 
Guatemala  -0.7 -0.3 -0.1  0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.9  0.1  0.7 
Haiti  -1.7 -1.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -3.1 -2.3 -1.5 -0.1 
Honduras  -0.8 -0.3  0.2  0.7 -0.2  0.2 -0.2 -0.7  0.8  0.8 
Chile  0.6 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.2 0.1 1.1 
Jamaica  -0.4 0.1 0.7 0.8  -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.7 
Mexico  0.2 0.6  -0.5 0.2 0.4  -0.1  -0.1  -0.7 0.5 0.8 
Nicaragua  -0.5 -0.3  0.5  0.9 -0.1  0.1 -0.8 -0.7  0.3  0.8 
Panama  0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.3 1.1 
Paraguay  -0.4  0.3 -0.2  0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.1  0.5  0.7 
Peru  0.2  0.5 -1.0 -0.5 -1.4 -0.2 -0.9 -0.5  0.4  0.8 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  -0.3 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.9 
Uruguay  0.6 0.9  -0.6  -0.5  -0.8  -0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.1 
Venezuela  0.5  0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0  0.8  0.2 
East Europe & CIS 
Albania  -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1  -0.2 0.0  -0.6  -0.3 0.7 
Armenia*  0.5  0.7 -0.9  0.6 -1.0 -0.9  0.1 -0.3 -0.2  0.1 
Azerbaijan*  0.3  0.5 -1.1  0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 -1.2 -0.6 
Belarus*  0.8  1.1 -1.2  0.7 -1.2 -1.0 -0.1 -1.2 -0.7 -0.6 
Bulgaria  1.0  1.1 -0.1  0.7 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2  0.1  1.0 
Croatia  0.8  1.2 -0.2  0.6 -0.5  0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2  0.7 
Georgia*  0.7  0.8 -1.4 -0.1 -1.6 -1.2 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0  0.5 
Kazakhstan* 0.5  0.6  -0.7 0.5  -1.0  -0.7 0.1 -0.5 -1.1 -0.9 
Kyrgyzstan*  0.1  0.3 -0.9  0.5 -1.1 -1.4  0.1 -0.7 -0.8 -0.5 
Macedonia, FYR*  0.5  0.7  -0.6  0.7 -0.7 -0.3  0.3 -0.8  0.1  0.7 
Moldova  0.5  0.6 -0.1  1.0 -0.8 -0.3  0.0 -0.3 -0.9  0.7 
Romania  0.5  0.9 -0.9  0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1  1.0 
Russia  0.8  1.2 -1.8 -0.4 -1.4 -0.5  0.0 -0.8 -0.5  0.2 
Tajikistan*  0.0 -0.1 -0.2  0.8 -1.0 -1.1 -2.2 -1.1 -1.6 -0.5 
Turkmenistan*  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.7 -1.3 -0.8 -0.5 -1.0 -1.8 -2.1 
Ukraine  0.8  1.0 -0.9  0.4 -1.5 -0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6  0.7 
Uzbekistan*  0.4  0.0 -1.0 -0.3 -0.8 -0.9 -0.6 -1.5 -1.6 -1.7   86
 
North Africa 
Algeria  -0.4  0.0 -0.7 -0.5  0.1  0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -1.6 -0.3 
Egypt  -0.1  0.5 -1.6 -1.9  0.5  0.9 -0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 
Mauritania*  -1.9 -1.0  0.1  0.5  0.4 -0.7  0.0 -0.3 -2.3 -0.5 
Morocco  -0.2 0.1  -1.3  -1.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4  -0.9  -0.8 
Tunisia  -0.2 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4  -1.2  -0.5 
South-East Asia 
Cambodia*  -2.3 -2.0 -0.4  0.7 -1.4 -0.9 -1.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 
China  -0.3  0.4 -0.2  0.1  1.8  1.4 -0.8 -0.7 -2.0 -1.8 
Indonesia  -0.7 -0.1 -0.1  0.1  0.4  0.5 -1.1 -1.5 -1.5  0.0 
Laos*  -2.1 -1.3 -0.2  0.3 -1.0 -1.0  0.0 -1.8 -1.8 -1.6 
Malaysia  0.2 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Papua  New  Guinea* -1.6  -1.3 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.0  -0.2  -0.5 0.9 1.0 
Philippines  0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.7  -0.6  -1.0 0.4 0.9 
Thailand  0.3 0.7 0.2 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.9 
Vietnam*  -1.8 -0.4  0.2  1.0 -0.6  0.5 -1.4 -1.6 -2.0 -1.5 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
Angola*  -2.2 -2.1  0.5  0.8 -1.7 -1.7 -1.4 -2.0 -1.4 -0.7 
Benin  -1.9 -1.5  0.2  0.1 -0.3 -0.5  0.2 -0.1 -0.3  0.6 
Botswana  -0.8  -0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 
Burkina  Faso*  -2.7 -1.8 -1.5 -1.4 -0.5 -0.3  0.0 -0.5 -1.4 -0.3 
Cameroon  -1.4 -1.2 -2.1 -1.6 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 -1.4 -1.4 -0.6 
Congo,  Dem.  Rep*  -2.0 -1.6 -0.6  0.3 -1.5 -2.2 -2.8 -2.3 -1.6 -2.0 
Congo,  Rep.  -1.4 -1.1 -0.2  0.2 -0.5 -1.1 -1.1 -1.5 -0.6 -0.7 
Cote  d'Ivoire  -1.4 -1.2 -0.2  0.3 -0.1 -0.5  0.1 -0.9 -1.2 -0.1 
Ethiopia*  -2.0 -2.5 -1.1  0.0  0.3  0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -1.6 -0.5 
Gabon  -1.1 -0.8 -0.2 -1.6 -0.7 -0.8  0.3  0.2 -1.0 -0.2 
Gambia  -2.1 -1.6  1.1  0.8 -0.6 -0.3  0.0 -0.3  0.6 -0.8 
Ghana  -1.3 -1.1  0.2  0.8 -0.9 -0.6  0.3 -0.1 -1.8  0.5 
Guinea  -2.4 -2.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.8 -1.2 -0.1 -0.9 -1.9 -0.3 
Chad*  -3.0 -2.8 -0.5  0.8 -0.9 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.8 -1.0 
Kenya  -1.2 -0.8  0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.9 -1.0  0.2 
Madagascar  -1.2 -1.5 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.4  0.0  0.3  0.8 
Malawi  -2.4 -2.2  0.2  0.3 -0.3 -1.0 -0.2  0.1 -1.6  0.5 
Mali  -2.8 -2.3 -0.7  0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5  0.0 -0.3  0.7 
Mauritius  -0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.9 
Mozambique  -2.8 -2.5  0.2  0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -0.8 -0.8 -1.2  0.5 
Namibia  -0.7  -0.7 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 
Niger  -2.8 -2.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -1.2 -0.9 -0.8 -1.0  0.0 
Nigeria  -1.7 -1.1  0.4  0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -1.1 -1.7 -0.9 
Senegal  -1.6 -1.2 -0.4  0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -1.2 -0.2  0.2  0.7 
Sierra  Leone  -2.3 -1.9 -1.6 -0.5 -1.3 -1.1 -2.0 -0.5 -1.6 -0.5 
South  Africa  0.1 0.2  -0.6 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 
Sudan*  -1.8 -1.1 -1.3 -0.6 -1.2 -1.4 -1.6 -2.2 -1.5 -2.1 
Swaziland  -1.0  -0.8 1.4 1.3 0.0  -0.3 0.6 0.4  -2.9  -1.7 
Tanzania  -2.0 -1.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.9 -0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -1.4  0.2 
Togo  -1.5 -1.2 -0.1  0.7 -0.1 -0.5 -0.9 -1.2 -1.4 -0.4 
Uganda  -1.6 -1.4 -0.9  0.1 -1.2 -0.8 -0.7  0.0 -0.9 -0.4 
Zambia  -1.6 -1.5  0.1  0.7 -1.8 -0.9  0.0 -0.1 -0.3  0.3 
Zimbabwe  -0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -0.1  0.3 -0.4  0.0 -1.3 -0.1 -0.4   87
 
Central Asia 
Bangladesh  -1.6 -1.2 -1.4 -0.7 -0.1  0.1 -1.3 -1.7  0.1  0.7 
India  -0.6 -0.2 -1.8 -1.1  0.1  1.1 -1.7 -1.1  0.7  0.9 
Mongolia  0.0 0.1 0.2 0.9  -0.7  -0.5 0.7 0.1  -0.2 0.7 
Nepal  -1.8 -1.2 -0.9 -0.6  1.2  0.5 -0.2 -1.5  0.2  0.7 
Pakistan  -0.9 -1.0 -0.6 -0.4  0.1  0.2 -0.4 -1.1  0.1 -0.2 
Sri  Lanka  -0.6 -0.1  0.2  0.4 -0.1  0.2 -0.4 -0.1  0.5  0.7 
 
Note: For definition of the variables see Table 4. Countries with a high level of missing data (between 15% and 30%) 
and countries influenced by military conflicts are marked by stars.   88
Appendix A3: Regression results - growth (excluding 
countries with the most missing data and wars) 
 
Construction method of the 




















































































































































Constant  0.00 -0.05  0.00 -0.01  0.00 -0.05 
   (0.69) (0.66) (0.41) (0.12) (0.53) (0.69) 
Log of the initial   -0.31 -0.24 -0.15 -0.18 -0.25*  -0.12 
GDP per capita   (1.18) (1.32) (0.54) (0.91) (1.91) (0.98) 
Knowledge  0.02  0.08 -0.35 -0.06     
  (0.06) (0.45) (1.12) (0.25)     
Openness  0.04  -0.01 0.14  -0.02 0.13 0.01 
   (0.49) (0.19) (1.13) (0.21) (1.40) (0.09) 
Financial system  0.37**  0.17 0.25 0.07 0.20 0.04 
   (2.43) (1.62) (1.60) (0.60) (1.64) (0.41) 
Governance  0.34*** 0.33***  0.38** 0.33** 0.34***  0.32*** 
   (2.72) (2.75) (2.63) (2.39) (2.92) (2.65) 
Democracy  0.24 0.19 0.34*  0.28**  0.34**  0.32*** 
   (1.30) (1.66) (1.71) (2.11) (2.29) (2.94) 
∆ knowledge  0.30*** 0.33***  0.33*** 0.30*** 0.42*** 0.36*** 
  (3.48) (3.83) (2.93  (3.05) (3.99) (4.20) 
∆ openness  0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04     
   (0.57) (0.30) (0.20) (0.41)     
∆ financial system  0.14***  0.12 0.09 0.07     
   (1.31) (1.26) (0.77) (0.66)     
∆ governance  0.10 0.19**  0.15 0.20**  0.18 0.22*** 
   (0.91) (2.49) (1.26) (2.52) (1.43) (3.01) 
∆ democracy  0.23 0.24**  0.20 0.24**  0.20*  0.27*** 
   (1.44) (2.45) (1.20) (2.28) (1.71) (3.02) 
Longitude of country centroid  ..  ..  0.15** 0.13*  0.14** 0.15** 
  ..  ..  (2.40) (1.82) (2.49) (2.19) 
Latitude of country centroid  .. ..  0.11  0.05     
   .. ..  (1.33)  (0.63)     
Log of land area  .. ..  0.03  -0.07     
   .. ..  (0.17)  (0.72)     
Log of mean elevation  ..  ..  0.17 0.07 0.13 0.03 
   ..  ..  (1.18) (0.75) (1.42) (0.41) 
Access to ocean or navigable river  .. ..  0.04  0.05     
  .. ..  (0.28)  (0.36)     
Malaria ecology  .. ..  -0.06  -0.04     
   .. ..  (0.49)  (0.36)     
Cultural fractionalization  .. ..  -0.12  0.02     
   .. ..  (1.04)  (0.23)     
Religious fractionalization  .. ..  0.09  0.03     
   .. ..  (0.76)  (0.42)     
Log of oil & gas deposits per capita  ..  ..  0.15 0.09 0.13*  0.06 
  ..  ..  (1.47) (1.02) (1.65) (0.87) 
F  6.88 5.06 4.05 2.80 7.14 5.46 
R
2  0.32 ..  0.39 ..  0.36 .. 
Observations  110 110 110 110 110 110 
 
Note: Depended variable is annual growth of GDP per capita over 1992-2002 (PPP, constant 1995 USD). 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in brackets; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standardized variables used in the estimates (beta values reported). 